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COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
“TROUBLES” IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
JULIANA VAN HOEVEN 
“In Northern Ireland, the past is the present.  If we don’t deal 
with the past, I don’t want my grandchildren's rights to have 
to suffer this again.  As injured people, we are living scars in 
society and we need to have it recognised that we have 
suffered.“ 
– Peter Heathwood, paralyzed victim of a gunshot wound delivered 
by suspected loyalist gunmen in September, 1979.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
1 Northern Ireland: Amnesty Slams Failure to Deal with Past, AMNESTY INT’L UK 
PRESS RELEASES (Sept. 12, 2013, 12:00AM), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-re-
leases/northern-ireland-amnesty-slams-failure-deal-past [perma.cc/KN8B-TK9F] 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2016). 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Few outside of Northern Ireland realize that Belfast is a city still 
divided by “peace walls,” physical barriers that were originally 
constructed to divide the Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods 
from one another.2  Belfast is possibly the last city in Western Europe 
that does not preserve barrier walls solely for their allure as 
historical novelties or their draw as tourist attractions.3  Rather, 
nearly seventy percent of residents living near the Belfast walls want 
them to remain in place because they believe the structures are still 
necessary to prevent violence,4 though over two decades have 
passed since the Irish Republican Army (“IRA”) announced the end 
of its armed hostilities in Northern Ireland.5  Yet, although the 
period of horrific violence known as the “Troubles” has been 
declared over,6 the threat of aggression still looms in Belfast.7 
                                                     
2 Peter Geoghegan, Will Belfast ever have a Berlin Wall Moment and tear down its 
peace walls?, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2015, 02:30 EDT), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/cities/2015/sep/29/belfast-berlin-wall-moment-permanent-peace-walls 
[perma.cc/WS2G-QZ9N] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016); Henry McDonald, No end in 
Sight for Belfast ‘Peace Walls,’ THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2012, 19:04 EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/sep/26/belfast-peace-walls-republi-
cans-loyalists [https://perma.cc/33PL-R2EP] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016); see also 
Henry McDonald, Belfast ‘Peace Walls’ Will Come Down Only by Community Consent, 
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2013, 08:51 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/ uk-
news/2013/dec/03/belfast-peace-walls-dismantled-community-consent-minister 
[perma.cc/DDD4-GJQT] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016).  
3 McDonald, Belfast ‘Peace Walls’ Will Come Down Only by Community Consent, 
supra note 2 (noting that Belfast’s peace walls are “highly unusual among such bar-
riers around the world because most of those living closest to them continue to sup-
port their existence in successive opinion polls, mainly because of fear of attack 
from the community on the other side”).  
4 McDonald, No end in Sight for Belfast ‘Peace Walls,’ supra note 2.  
5 Vincent Kearney, ‘It’s Over’: Reporting the IRA Ceasefire 20 Years Ago, BBC 
NEWS (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-28957532 
[https://perma.cc/T8F3-WWY6] (last visited March 24, 2016). 
6 Brian Lavery & Alan Cowell, I.R.A. Renounces Violence, Vows to Disarm, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 29, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/29/world/europe/ira-
renounces-use-of-violence-vows-to-disarm [https://perma.cc/N9T6-NP58] (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2016) (the phrase “the Troubles” loosely refers to the period of near 
constant violence as militant forces battled each other on the streets of Belfast from 
roughly 1969 to1980).  
7 Henry McDonald, Northern Ireland Drafts in Police Reinforcements After More 
Violence, THE GUARDIAN (July 17, 2014, 07:00 EDT), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/uk-news/2013/jul/17/northern-ireland-police-belfast 
[https://perma.cc/BB9F-69QD] (detailing five consecutive nights of violence in 
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When the period of armed conflict officially drew to a close, the 
death and destruction it rendered left many questions of blame and 
reparations.  In particular, some citizens of Northern Ireland wanted 
to know more about the role of the police, the national army, and 
their government in implementing counter-terrorism strategies 
during the Troubles.  Decades later, many of these questions remain 
unanswered.  Further, much of the civil and criminal litigation that 
arose from these questions in the immediate aftermath of the 
Troubles also remains unresolved, due, in large part, to the actions, 
or lack thereof, of the British government.  Through strategic 
inactivity, as well as affirmative measures taken to ensure that the 
cases are not investigated, the government has stymied efforts of 
victims and their families to uncover the truth about the 
government’s role in the Troubles.  Why has this occurred?  
The United Kingdom is an advanced Western nation with the 
resources and ability to give all of its citizens access to judicial 
remedies.  Further, the United Kingdom does not lack the resources 
needed to establish a large-scale public inquiry or to launch a truth 
commission to address the resolution of Troubles-related violence.  
It has the organizational capacity to install these or other 
mechanisms of transitional justice, which many scholars have 
argued could result in healing for post-conflict Northern Ireland.8  
Transitional justice mechanisms are popular and innovative ideas 
aimed at solving complex problems that have often raged for 
centuries.  The United Nations defines transitional justice as “the full 
range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s 
attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in 
order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
                                                     
Belfast during the Marching Season of 2013.  Rival political and sectarian groups 
confronted each other all over the city, lighting cars on fire and throwing petrol 
bombs.  Five hundred additional police officers from overseas were called in to as-
sist in calming the hostilities.).  
8 Christopher K. Connolly, Living on the Past: The Role of Truth Commissions in 
Post-Conflict Societies and the Case Study of Northern Ireland, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 401, 
402 (2006) [hereinafter Connolly, Living on the Past] (arguing that “the implementa-
tion of a transitional justice mechanism that confronts the legacy of the Troubles is 
crucial for the future of the peace process”); see Brandon Hamber, Rights and Rea-
sons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1074, 1074 (2002-2003) (observing that “[c]urrently . . . the possibility of 
holding public hearings, advancing societal and individual healing, and taking part 
in or promoting a process of reconciliation (however defined) has opened wide the 
question [of how best to gather information concerning transitional societies] . . . .”) 
(quotation omitted).  
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reconciliation.”9  Mechanisms to achieve these goals include truth 
commissions, prosecutorial initiatives, institutional reform and 
national consultations.10  These practices, or a combination of them, 
are often specifically tailored to meet the needs of the individual 
country or region that has suffered violence.  Typically, however, all 
transitional justice mechanisms feature concurrent themes of 
honesty and truth telling in the hope of healing past wounds and 
reestablishing trust so that the citizens of a wounded region or 
nation can begin to move forward. 
The study of transitional justice has blossomed in the last 
decade.11  Many academics posit that, as a land in transition, 
inquests, truth commissions, or other mechanisms designed to 
resolve the trauma experienced by post-conflict societies should be 
applied in Northern Ireland.12  Currently, many questions about the 
British government’s involvement in the violence still remain.  Thus, 
some feel that an organized process through which those involved 
can acknowledge responsibility for the past conflict and perhaps 
even apologize for the losses inflicted, will allow the still-divided 
sectarian neighborhoods to begin to heal.13 
                                                     
9 Transitional Justice, UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, http://www.un-
rol.org/article.aspx? article_id=29 [perma.cc/2DGB-DVB2] (last visited Feb. 4, 
2016).  
10 Id.  
11 See About the Journal, THE INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST., available at 
http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/ijtj/about.html 
[https://perma.cc/G9RQ-JM7P] (last visited Mar. 18, 2016) (“Transitional justice 
has fast emerged as a recognised field of policy expertise, research and law, and 
today, is considered to be an academic discipline in its own right.”).  Institutes that 
have developed with a focus on transitional justice include the International Center 
for Transitional Justice (see TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DISPLACEMENT, 
https://www.ictj.org/our-work/research/transitional-justice-and-displacement 
[https://perma.cc/6598-JZGC] (last visited Mar. 18, 2016)), as well as the Transi-
tional Justice Programme of the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust, and Genocidal 
studies (see TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROGRAM, http://www.niod.nl/en/projects/ 
transitional-justice-programme [https://perma.cc/Z7E3-B6SX] (last visited Mar. 
18, 2016)). 
12 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8; Hamber, supra note 8.  
13 See, e.g., Patricia Lundy & Marck McGovern, Whose Justice? Rethinking Tran-
sitional Justice from the Bottom Up, 35 J.L. &. SOC’Y 265 (June 2008) (arguing that tran-
sitional justice needs a more participatory approach and examining the Ardoyne 
Commemoration Project for an example of an effective, organized truth-telling pro-
cess that allows for the participation of families of victims of violence in Belfast to 
tell the stories of their loved ones’ deaths); and ARDOYNE COMMEMORATION PROJECT, 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 
1096 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:3 
 
As a civilized Western government and self-proclaimed 
advocate of peace, the government of the United Kingdom and the 
ruling body of Northern Ireland should perhaps be one of the most 
adamant proponents of achieving this tranquility within its 
domain.14  Yet, as is often the case in transitioning societies,15 the 
British government is one of the largest opponents of any further 
investigation into the history of violence, even after judgments by 
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) have commanded 
such investigation.16  The United Kingdom has largely ignored the 
                                                     
ARDOYNE: THE UNTOLD TRUTH (2002), available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/vic-
tims/ardoyne/ardoyne02a.htm [https://perma.cc/6ABA-E98B] (last visited Mar. 
18, 2016) ( “Many of these testimonies speak of the brutality of a system that treated 
ordinary people with utter contempt and colluded to ensure lack of disclosure, ac-
countability and justice.”).  See also Brandon Hamber, Rights and Reasons: Challenges 
for Truth Recovery in South Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1074, 
1094 (noting that “at some point laying the past bare will be needed, and . . . this is 
the greatest, albeit difficult, guarantee of a stable future . . .”).  This view is by no 
means universally accepted.  Other historians have noted that “government initia-
tives to seek the 'truth' about historical events in Northern Ireland have both faced 
and created severe practical problems.”  Cillian McGratten, Historians in Post-Con-
flict Societies: Northern Ireland After the Troubles, HISTORY & POLICY (Mar. 3, 2011), 
available at http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/historians-
in-post-conflict-societies-northern-ireland-after-the-troubles 
[https://perma.cc/7GS4-L5XQ].  For example, judicial inquiries such as the Bloody 
Sunday Tribunal may be helpful in establishing basic chronologies and cause-and-
effect sequences, but they also serve to impose an authoritative narrative over vic-
tims' experiences.”  Id. 
14 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 13-14 
(2013) (summarizing a news article featured in the Guardian, in which Prime Min-
ister David Cameron notes that Britain has a long and exemplary record on human 
rights).  
15 Brandon Hamber, Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South 
Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1074, 1091 (noting that, in many 
cases, “[t]he practical and political challenge of making policy on matters concern-
ing those who have suffered . . . is compounded by the fact that . . . the government 
is also responsible for some of the violence”); see also Connolly, Living on the Past, 
supra note 8, at 418 (explaining that “notions of transitional justice assume state re-
sponsibility for the majority of past abuses”).  
16 Northern Ireland: Amnesty Slams Failure to Deal with Past, AMNESTY INT’L UK 
PRESS RELEASES (Sept. 12, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-re-
leases/northern-ireland-amnesty-slams-failure-deal-past [perma.cc/KN8B-TK9F] 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2016) (the press release “blames the failure to deliver truth and 
justice on a lack of political will from . . . the UK government”); see also Christine 
Bell, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1095, 1099 (2002-
2003) (noting that “in Northern Ireland, key gaps in the issues being addressed, 
such as accountability for State actors, can be identified as serving to undermine 
the principles of equality and parity, which underlie the Agreement, and with 
these, confidence in the peace process”).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/6
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ECtHR judgments17 and has stubbornly dismissed any proposals for 
implementing more widespread transitional justice mechanisms or 
truth telling.18 
Many have presumed that the reason for the lack of interest in 
transitional justice displayed by the British government stems from 
the fact that the government does not want to revisit its ugly past.19  
Indeed, a thorough judicial process could expose the suspected 
coercive role that the British Armed Forces may have played in the 
bloodshed.20  Although the violence was predominantly isolated 
within the United Kingdom, tensions within Northern Ireland 
caused bloodshed in other parts of the European continent, which 
could result in the perpetrators suffering widespread 
embarrassment.21 22 
Most assuredly, the latter interpretation for the government’s 
inaction is correct, but perhaps other reasoning exists for this latency 
as well.  Unbidden, British Prime Minister David Cameron has 
publicly apologized to the family of renowned Belfast human rights 
attorney Pat Finucane for the “unacceptable” role that British forces 
played in bringing about Finucane’s murder at the hands of militant 
                                                     
17 See infra Part 3.2. (discussing the effects of the judgments of the ECtHR).  
18 See ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 14.   
19 Northern Ireland: Victims Say “We’re an Embarrassment to Politicians, but We 
Demand Action on the Past,” AMNESTY INT’L UK PRESS RELEASES, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/northern-ireland-victims-say-were-
embarrassment-politicians-we-demand-action-past [perma.cc/U9YM-698K] (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2016) (suggesting that British politicians are embarrassed by the gov-
ernment’s past acts).  
20 Some sources estimate that British state forces were directly responsible for 
about ten percent of the deaths in Northern Ireland, and could have indirectly fa-
cilitated many more.  Cillian McGratten, Historians in Post-Conflict Societies: Northern 
Ireland After the Troubles, HISTORY & POLICY (Mar. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/historians-in-post-con-
flict-societies-northern-ireland-after-the-troubles [https://perma.cc/7GS4-L5XQ] 
(noting that British state forces such as the army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
were responsible for approximately 9.9% of the bloodshed during the Troubles). 
21 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 417-18 (noting that “[r]ather than 
accept responsibility for these deaths, Britain has generally ‘concealed and dis-
torted’ the role of state actors in the conflict” (quoting TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A 
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, Henry J. Steiner, ed.)). 
22 Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman, supra note 14 at 922-25(describing violence 
after British troops apprehended PIRA agents in Gibraltar).   
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Protestants.23  Clearly, Cameron’s behavior demonstrates a degree 
of willingness on behalf of the government to accept accountability 
for such past acts.  Yet, despite Cameron’s apology, the British 
government still refuses to launch an official, independent and 
transparent public inquiry into Finucane’s death.24  The government 
declines to provide the details of its role in the tragedy that such an 
investigation would reveal.  Given that the British government has 
accepted a measure of guilt by issuing its apology, why has the 
adjudication of this case, along with so many other cases still 
plagued by questions and mystery, been so evasive?25 
The British government’s aversion to truth and its disregard for 
the demands of the international human rights community may be 
centered on more than just shame for its past misdeeds.  A 
widespread judicial investigation into counter-terrorist acts could 
result in jurisprudence that defines, with specificity, which of those 
actions are legally permissible and which are not.  In the post-
September 11th age, the rules of engagement regarding counter-
terrorist measures lie amidst murky and undefined judicial waters.26  
Where clear rules do exist, governments have broken these rules and 
justified the infringement in the name of domestic security.  Like the 
clearly defined rules themselves, determinations of the merits of 
such self-defense arguments are equally obscure.  Further, there is 
an absence of meaningful official admonishment from domestic 
judicial systems and larger international legal systems for 
governments that violate these rules.  This lack of clarity and 
absence of retribution allows state actors considerable leeway to do 
as they please in the name of defense against terrorism.  A defined 
body of jurisprudence could dispel the obscurity on which this 
                                                     
23 Henry McDonald & Owen Bowcott, David Cameron Admits “Shocking Levels 
of Collusion” in Pat Finucane Murder, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2012, 16:17 EST), 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/12/david-cameron-pat-finucane-
murder[perma.cc/J79N-TA35] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016). 
24 See id. (noting that the apology has “failed to quell demands ‘from [Finu-
cane’s] family, human rights organizations [sic] and the Irish government for a full 
public inquiry’”). 
25 Id.; Henry McDonald, Pat Finucane Murder: PM’s Decision Not to Hold Inde-
pendent Inquiry Upheld, The Guardian (June 26, 2015), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/26/pat-finucane-pms-deci-
sion-not-to-hold-independent-inquiry-upheld [https://perma.cc/F34D-PACC].   
26 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 386 (2013) 
(describing the international rules of terrorism as “unsettled” and noting that the 
national and legal conceptions of terrorism vary significantly).   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/6
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unbounded system depends.  This rationale could represent an 
alternative reason for why the British government refuses to attend 
to post-Troubles litigation. 
Part 2 of this paper will briefly lay out the history of the conflict 
in Northern Ireland, with a special emphasis on the time period of 
the Troubles, when British Forces were most involved in the conflict; 
in particular, this paper will outline the specific role the government 
allegedly played.27  Part 3 will examine some of the judicial methods 
that have been used to reveal the truth surrounding the British 
government’s involvement in the Troubles.  In particular, two 
separate legal battles involving the murders of Pearse Jordan and 
Pat Finucane will be discussed, because these cases aptly 
demonstrate some of the challenges that families face when trying 
to resolve historical murders that allegedly included government 
involvement or assistance.28  Importantly, both cases also showcase 
the interplay between domestic judicial mechanisms and 
international judicial responses.  Ultimately, this paper will 
demonstrate that despite numerous efforts to bring historical cases 
to the attention of British authorities, to this day, domestic official 
bodies have done little to rectify the barriers to justice that exist for 
victims of the Troubles and their families.  In the most extreme cases, 
authorities have continued to actively oppose the judicial resolution 
of these cases.   
Part 4 will consider international human rights law and 
humanitarian law in the context of the Troubles, and extrapolate the 
analysis to include post-September 11th counter-terrorism measures.  
The application and enforcement of human rights law in cases 
involving counter-terrorism measures is important because 
enforcement failures suggest that litigating the Troubles cases could 
generate examples of how best to fill this enforcement gap.  Finally, 
Part 5 will discuss how litigating these historical cases could impact 
not only the United Kingdom, but also counter-terrorism legislation 
throughout the rest of the Western world.  Ultimately, large gaps in 
enforcement remain in the legal field which, if defined and filled, 
could better clarify and standardize the rules of procedure when 
human rights law conflicts with security interests and counter-
terrorism measures.  
                                                     
27 See infra Part 2.  
28 See infra Part 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.  
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Counter-terrorism is a form of warfare that emphasizes secrecy 
and clandestine acts, for obvious reasons of societal safety.  
Monitoring and apprehending non-state actors is complex and 
challenging, to say the least, because non-state actors, as well as their 
supporters, often operate in the shadows.  A strongly enforced body 
of humanitarian law is needed to better define and protect the 
participants in this technologically advanced age of warfare.  This 
paper will conclude by suggesting that, in an ideal world, the British 
courts represent the best possible vehicle for litigating the Troubles 
cases and enforcing this law, as the courts are not only well 
respected by both the Parliament and the citizens of the United 
Kingdom, but command international attention as well.29  Further, 
because the majority of the strongest actors in the Troubles were 
citizens of, or have ties to, the United Kingdom, a system within the 
same country is more likely to understand the complexities of the 
conflict and to be respected by the actors involved, even though the 
same governmental organ contributed to the bloodshed.  Despite a 
tumultuous past, allowing a stable and secure nation to deal with its 
own can be an important part of the healing process.  Briefly, 
possible mitigating solutions such as amnesty, or the preservation 
of anonymity for all who come forward to recount their roles in the 
violence of the Troubles will be considered as mechanisms to assist 
the courts in achieving governmental participation.30    
Ultimately, litigating the historical cases of the Troubles is 
important, not only because interested victims and their families 
deserve resolution, but also because the cases can have a wider 
impact on current counter-terrorism protocol.  The cases are 
representative of many of the problems that the aftermath of broad, 
sweeping strokes of counter-terrorism can generate.  Drawing 
attention to the individual cases is important, but through them 
there may also be acknowledgement of the broader wrongdoing of 
the British government in its counter-terrorism strategy which is 
essential.  It is this wide attention to government transgressions that 
could beneficially contribute to international human rights law as a 
whole.31  
It is important to note that this paper’s proposals are in relation 
to broader human rights literature.  Restrictions on what 
                                                     
29 See infra Conclusion.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.    
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/6
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government actors may and may not do in the course of armed 
conflict certainly exist in the form of humanitarian law.32  The 
Geneva Conventions are perhaps the most well-known example of 
war-time human rights law, and there has been a large push 
towards enforcing this type of legislation in unofficial armed 
conflict, both within and across borders.  However, enforcement 
remains a difficult problem to tackle, as will be discussed further 
below.  Identifying the actors, communicating human rights 
obligations to them, and enforcing those obligations have rarely 
been accomplished with success, especially in advance of the acts 
that we seek to preempt.  Thus, “the resort to international tribunals, 
national courts or regional bodies” is common.33  Particularly with 
state actors such as the United Kingdom and the United States, 
international law often comes secondary to domestic law and there 
is an unparalleled emphasis on domestic security.  This attitude 
promotes the absence of enforcement.34  Because the Troubles cases 
uniquely impact the United Kingdom,35 they are perhaps singular in 
that they represent a predominantly concluded but still partially 
unsettled36 modern opportunity for domestic courts to incorporate 
international humanitarian law in relation to counter-terrorism 
measures.  
Northern Ireland is in a state of transition, and increasingly, in a 
state of hope.  The infringements on civil rights embodied by 
seemingly small measures such as checkpoints and government 
enforced curfews, as well as the horrific infringements caused by the 
violence of near daily sectarian killings that once haunted the region, 
are a thing of the past.37  Everywhere, people talk of the progress 
                                                     
32 Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman, supra note 14 at 70 (noting that a rich body 
of legal rules and principles has developed over time).   
33 Id. at 383.  
34 Id.  
35 Nearly all of the actors are citizens of the United Kingdom.  
36 Alec Forss, Winning the Peace in Northern Ireland, PEACE DIRECT; INSIGHT ON 
CONFLICT (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.insightonconflict.org/2015/12/winning-
peace-northern-ireland/ [https://perma.cc/S8XM-STDL] (noting that “[p]aramili-
tary groupings, albeit on a lesser scale compared to the past, continue to instill fear 
among communities and engage in gangland-style violence, with punishment at-
tacks and even murder occurring openly on the streets”). 
37 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 402.  The last sectarian killing 
occurred in 2002.  See Gerard Lawlor Community Inquiry, Report and Recommendations 
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that Northern Ireland as a whole has made.38  They do not 
emphasize only the roles of Catholics, or only the roles of 
Protestants.  Similarly, this paper strives to avoid adopting a 
sectarian position.39  Rather, it focuses on the role of the British 
government against the people of Northern Ireland generally, 
regardless of what religion they happened to be, or which political 
stance they took.  A government has a duty to protect its people, and 
the British government did a disservice to both “sides” by 
abandoning this duty.  To make up for this flagrant abandonment, 
the actors in this conflict need to resolve the Troubles litigation in a 
way that not only provides closure and lasting peace, but also in a 
way that inspires hope for peace in the aftermath of other conflicts 
as well.  Admittedly, this is a tall order. 
This paper does not seek to propose a solution that injects 
humanitarian law into counter-terrorism measures in a forward-
looking way.  Simply put, it does not and certainly cannot seek to 
rectify all of the world’s problems going forward by predicting the 
humanitarian rules that should be applicable in the macabre game 
of terrorism and counter-terrorism.  No one would follow them 
anyway – that is the point of terrorism.  Rather, this paper seeks to 
suggest effective mechanisms to promote healing and perhaps to 
mitigate damages, or at least understand that they are being 
inflicted, which is an important dialogue that should transpire.  
2.  BACKGROUND & HISTORY OF NORTHERN IRELAND 
The history of tension between the Irish and the English is 
ancient, going back to before the 12th century, with the series of 
                                                     
(Nov. 2012), available at http://relativesforjustice.com/wp-content/            up-
loads/2012/11/Gerard_Report_2012-WEB1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF5D-MJHU] 
(stating that “Gerard Lawlor was the last Catholic civilian to be shot dead as a result 
of the Northern Ireland conflict” on July 22, 2002). 
38 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 402.  
39 Of course, readers may disagree with my efforts, or with the notion that such 
a thing as impartiality is even possible when it comes to any recounting of the Trou-
bles.  I tend to agree that impartiality is impossible when the history of Northern 
Ireland is discussed, but it should nevertheless remain a lofty goal.  In the astute 
words of Ciarán MacAirt as he introduced his book, The McGurk’s Bar Bombing, 
“history before and history since, has been a contest in itself.  A similar contest may 
even be played out between the pages of this book – between writer and reader . . . 
.”  As did MacAirt, I am aware of those tensions.  I ask only that readers bear wit-
ness to my humble attempts to retell a history so essential to a modern understand-
ing of the conflict moving forward. 
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Norman invasions into the Emerald Isle that first brought it under 
English rule.40  As time progressed, the northeastern province of 
Ireland known as Ulster was predominantly settled by Scottish and 
English immigrants.41  Ulster became economically more viable than 
the rest of the island, which remained Irish, and therefore the British 
found Ulster a more desirable foothold.  In 1690, Protestant King 
William of Orange defeated the deposed Catholic King James II in a 
fierce and decisive battle outside of Dublin and took control of the 
country.42  Known as the Battle of the Boyne, Protestants in Northern 
Ireland celebrate the victory over the local Irish and predominantly 
Catholic forces to this day, with a series of parade marches leading 
up to the July 12th anniversary.43  Over time, Catholics have 
responded with their own demonstrations and marches to 
symbolize their displeasure with the conquering “invaders.”  This 
annual tradition of parades is known as the Marching Season, and 
is a period that is emotionally charged and prone to violence.44  
Despite the near-constant references to religion, the 
contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland is largely political, not 
religious, in nature.  However, one’s religion is often an accurate 
                                                     
40  “For Republicans the twelfth century Norman invasions, sixteenth century 
Surrender and Re-grant treaties and Nine Years’ War, and seventeenth and eight-
eenth century plantations and penal laws provide grounds for their struggle against 
the Loyalists.” Laura K. Donahue, Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal Democracy: 
Lessons from the United Kingdom, 8 (BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-05, Aug. 2000).  
The sixteenth century risings by the Irish Catholics, the 1689 Siege of Derry, the 
1690 Battle of the Boyne, and agrarian risings throughout the eighteenth century 
supply the basis for Loyalist claims.  Id.  
41 See BBC, Wars & Conflict: The Plantation User (Sept. 18, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/plantation/ [https://perma.cc/U2PD-
VGE7] (discussing the “plantation of Ulster” by English and Scottish Protestants on 
land confiscated from the Gaelic Irish).  
42 More Information About: The Battle of the Boyne, BBC HISTORY, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/battle_of_the_boyne [perma.cc/2XGX-
R7UT] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
43 Id.  
44 See Henry McDonald, 3,000 Police Deployed for Climax of Northern Ireland’s 
Marching Season, THE GUARDIAN (July 13, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
uk-news/2015/jul/13/3000-police-northern-irelands-marching-season 
[https://perma.cc/ZB8R-6WS3] (describing precautions taken for the 2015 march-
ing season as well as violence in the 2013 parades, which resulted in “widespread 
rioting and disorder, with dozens of police officers injured in the violence”). 
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indicator of one’s views on the divisive conflict.45  Before the 
Republic of Ireland was established, “Protestants and Catholics 
divided into two warring camps over the issue of Irish home rule.  
Most Irish Catholics desired complete independence from Britain, 
but Irish Protestants feared living in a country ruled by a Catholic 
majority.”46  Great Britain also had a pronounced economic interest 
in maintaining control over the wealthy Ulster province, and so 
threw its support behind the Protestant Irishmen who disfavored 
home rule.  After a series of rebellions in 1798, 1803, 1848, 1867 and 
1916, and the Irish War of Independence from 1919 to 1921,47 it was 
agreed that the twenty-six southern counties of Ireland would be 
severed from British rule with the option to form their own country, 
now the Republic of Ireland.48  The remaining six counties, together 
forming Ulster, would remain under British domain.49  The split 
regarding the number of counties is what now explains the 
mathematically puzzling slogan of those who support one unified 
Irish republic, “26 + 6 = 1.”50 
After the divide, Ulster was ruled by a, largely British, Protestant 
majority that was fiercely loyal to the idea of remaining under 
British rule; hence, supporters of Protestant interests are known as 
“Loyalists,” much like the “Loyalists” of the American Revolution 
who supported British rule as well.  The Protestant majority 
instituted policies of discrimination all across Ulster to subdue the 
Catholics, who continued to support the rebellious idea of joining 
Ulster with the rest of the Republic of Ireland.  Consequently, they 
are often called “Republicans.”  The discrimination generally 
included depriving Catholics of voting rights, as well as access to 
                                                     
45 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 405; see also More Information 
About: The Troubles, BBC HISTORY, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ trou-
bles [perma.cc/8ZZN-XHFN] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (noting that this was a ter-
ritorial conflict, not a religious one). 
46 The Northern Irish Conflict, A Chronology, INFOPLEASE, available at 
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/northireland1.html [perma.cc/FFF2-2SY2] (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
47 Id.  
48 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 411.  See also Donahue, supra note 
40, p. 2 (explaining that the agreement was struck to alleviate the drain on British 
resources and to placate some of the demands in Ireland). 
49 Id.  
50 Joseph E. Thompson, America’s Role in the Northern Ireland Peace Process, in 
DIASPORA LOBBIES AND THE US GOVERNMENT: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN 
MAKING FOREIGN POLICY (Josh DeWind & Renata Segura eds., 2014).  
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housing, employment and education.  Pogroms also resulted in the 
burning and destruction of Catholic homes and businesses across 
the region.51  The pro-British Northern Irish government instituted 
additional security measures to consolidate its control over Ulster.  
In particular, the 1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 
(“SPA”) “empowered the Northern Ireland Parliament to impose a 
curfew; proscribe organizations; censor printed, audio, and visual 
materials; ban meetings, processions and gatherings; restrict the 
movement of individuals to within specific areas; and detain and 
intern suspects without bringing charges.”52  The SPA also 
authorized police to exercise broad powers of entry, search and 
seizure.53  Though meant to be a temporary measure, the SPA soon 
“became a necessity for maintaining the North’s constitutional 
position.”54  After a period of relative calm,55 the SPA grew even 
more contentious during the 1960’s, when American civil rights 
movements inspired Catholics to protest not only against British 
rule generally, but for rights equal to those enjoyed by Protestants 
from a pure equality standpoint as well.  
Ultimately, the violent thirty-year conflict known as the 
“Troubles” was sparked by a Catholic civil rights march on October 
5, 1968, in the town known as Derry to Catholics and called 
Londonderry by Protestants.56  Local Protestants responded 
                                                     
51 CIARAN MACAIRT, THE MCGURK’S BAR BOMBING: COLLUSION, COVER-UP AND 
A CAMPAIGN FOR TRUTH 143-50 (2013) (describing the destruction of Catholic homes 
and store fronts in predominantly Protestant towns in Ulster).  
52 Laura K. Donahue, Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons 
from the United Kingdom, BELFNER CENTER FOR SCI. & INT’L AFF., Discussion Paper 
2000-05, at 4 (Aug. 2000), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/        pub-
lication/2769/civil_liberties_terrorism_and_liberal_democracy.html 
[https://perma.cc/2CSD-3GU6] (last visited Mar. 18, 2016). 
53 Id.   
54 Id.   
55 See Soldiers’ Stories, Northern Ireland Conflict, BBC HISTORY, available at 
http://www.history.co.uk/shows/soldiers-stories/articles/northern-ireland-
conflict [https://perma.cc/F27X-ZPTW] (last visited Mar. 18, 2016) (“Calm pre-
vailed for several decades in Northern Ireland, owed in large part to the rule of 
Prime Minister Viscount Brookeborough, who was in office for 20 years. His polit-
ical allegiance with the Ulster Unionists marginalised the Catholic minority both 
socially and politically.”). 
56 More Information About: The Troubles, BBC HISTORY, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles [perma.cc/8ZZN-XHFN] (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2016).  The choice of which name to use was one way that Catholics and 
Protestants could easily identify each other in the course of everyday life.  Id.  Thus, 
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violently to the march and the situation quickly deteriorated.57  
Catholics and Protestants across the country rapidly consolidated 
their supporters and organized into pseudo-military groups that 
had been coagulating organically for decades.58  Both groups began 
to target militant actors, politicians, and civilians of the opposing 
group alike,59 often regarding “kills” (attacks on anyone known to 
be Protestant or Catholic that resulted in death) as badges of honor.60  
Graffiti and large murals delineating the boundaries of the Catholic 
and Protestant neighborhoods quickly sprang up, glorifying the 
conflict and featuring portraits of the most vicious paramilitary 
soldiers as heroes.61  Other themes indicating support for either side 
                                                     
purchasing a bus ticket to a location or mentioning the name of your hometown 
involved an important political choice of which name to use, and would identify 
your leanings to those around you instantly.  Id.   
Even the name of the state, Northern Ireland, has been highly politicized, with 
fiercely Republican Catholics calling it the “north of Ireland” (indicating a geo-
graphic location and not a state) and British Protestants using “Northern Ireland,” 
the terminology instituted to describe the state by the United Kingdom.  Id.   
57 Id. (by 1972, the situation had deteriorated so badly that the British govern-
ment suspended the Northern Ireland parliament and imposed direct rule from 
London).  
58 The most famous of these remains the Catholic IRA (Irish Republican 
Army), while predominant Protestant groups include the UDA (Ulster Defense As-
sociation), UDF (Ulster Defense Force) and UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force).  Id.  See 
Soldiers’ Stories, Northern Ireland Conflict, BBC HISTORY, available at http://www.his-
tory.co.uk/shows/soldiers-stories/articles/northern-ireland-conflict 
[https://perma.cc/F27X-ZPTW] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (“This descent into vi-
olence precipitated the need for armed forces on both sides.”). 
59 Joaquin P. Terceno III, Burying the Truth: The Murder of Belfast Human Rights 
Lawyer Patrick Finucane and Britain’s “Secret” Public Inquires, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 6, 
3297, 3304 (2006) (“Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries killing each other was 
not uncommon . . . and neither was the targeting of potentially innocent individuals 
believed to support the paramilitary groups.”). 
60 See Montgomery Sapone, Ceasefire: The Impact of Republican Political Culture 
on the Ceasefire Process in Northern Ireland, Geo. Mason U.: The Network of Peace & 
Conflict Stud., available at http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/ 
SAPONE71PCS.html [https://perma.cc/N4BN-W7K3] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) 
(“Another indication of the unchallenged legitimacy of armed struggle within the 
Republican community is that the IRA has never suffered from a paucity of volun-
teers.  While it may seem incomprehensible that Provisional IRA volunteers chose 
to engage in military activities likely to result in death or imprisonment, to them 
the choice appears not only necessary but desirable. Status in [the Northern Irish] 
community is correlated with military competence.  Bearing arms in the pursuit of 
Irish autonomy is considered to be the ultimate expression of Republicanism.”). 
61 Jeffrey A. Sluka, The Politics of Painting: Political Murals in Northern Ireland, in 
THE PATHS TO DOMINATION, RESISTANCE AND TERROR 190, 190-195 (Carolyn 
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were also common, including images of William of Orange, the 
Battle of the Boyne, and the Titanic (which held significance for the 
Protestants as it was built by Protestant workers in Belfast)62 as well 
as portraits of hunger strikers,63 entrapped doves, and IRA guerillas 
firing weapons.64  
The national government soon took action in an attempt to 
achieve stability over the region by dissolving the Northern Ireland 
regional government and instituting direct rule from London.65  The 
new governmental system immediately utilized the regional 
emergency legislation that had already been a feature of the 
program to subdue Catholics in Northern Ireland.66  British troops 
                                                     
Nordstron & JoAnn Martin eds., (explaining that the murals “are important sym-
bolic representations of the political conflict between the two ethnic communities”).  
See id. (“Republicans in Northern Ireland have successfully adapted to the misfor-
tune by transforming the tragedy of violent death into communal benefit.  The spec-
tacular funerals of slain IRA volunteers, the treatment of the 1981 hungerstrikers as 
martyrs, and the murals glorifying the Republican dead all testify to the capacity of 
Republicans to derive cultural value from politically motivated deaths.  Violent 
death is seen not just as a necessity of the armed struggle against the British, but as 
a sacrifice which only serves to make the culture stronger.  Although Republican 
culture could be negatively described as "necrophilic," the sanctification of violent 
death is a highly adaptive cultural practice within a militarized environment.”). 
62 Sluka, supra note 61, at 194 (describing the themes common in Protestant 
mural painting).   
63 The term hunger strikers describes imprisoned Catholic activists who went 
on hunger strikes during their imprisonment to protest their treatment as criminals 
rather than as prisoners of war, with the attendant classification as political prison-
ers.  See Hunger Strikers in the Maze Prison, BBC HISTORY, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/republican_hunger_strikes_maze 
[https://perma.cc/26FS-22NP] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).  Arguably the most fa-
mous of these was hunger striker Bobby Sands.  Id. Sands was also the first activist 
to starve to death while in prison as a result of a hunger strike, though in total ten 
prisoners would die before the strike ceased. Id.  His portrait remains an extremely 
common visual theme in Catholic murals. See Sluka at 198. 
64 See Sluka at 198-99 (describing the themes common in Catholic murals).  
Language and slogans on the murals included Gaelic language, quotes by and por-
traits of famous political figures, but also more ominous messages like “Warning! 
Irish Republican Army-occupied territory, British Forces enter at own risk.”  Id. at 
204.  
65 See Donahue, supra note 40, at 4 (noting that direct rule was instituted in 
1972).  
66 Id. at 3-4 (describing the use of emergency powers in Northern Ireland from 
1922 onward).  
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had previously been sent in to help restore order,67 and they began 
to operate under these laws as well.68  So began the policy of direct 
involvement of the British Forces with the armed paramilitary 
groups of Northern Ireland, and the conflict that would eventually 
claim upwards of 3,700 lives.69  
2.1. Paramilitaries as Terrorists and the Implications of the Geneva 
Conventions 
The British government used the hostile situation to justify a 
rapid resort to measures that undoubtedly constituted human rights 
abuses in order to subdue the violence in Northern Ireland.70  As the 
government’s tactics escalated, so did the Catholic resolve that 
nothing short of British withdrawal from Ulster and Irish unification 
would suffice.71  
At the same time, British officials began to deny that the scenario 
in Northern Ireland was a civil war and started to refer to IRA 
paramilitaries exclusively as “terrorists.”72  The informal bands of 
                                                     
67 See On This Day 14 August, BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/14/newsid_4075000/4075437.stm 
[https://perma.cc/4T9S-CHW8] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
68 See Donahue, supra note 40, at 8 (“[T]here . . . existed a tendency within the 
security forces to support the extension of such measures as part of their arsenal in 
the fight against terrorism . . . .”). 
69 Though this number may not seem large given the tragically vast scale of 
modern violence, it is important to keep in mind the size of the Northern Irish pop-
ulation.  3,700 deaths would translate into roughly 500,000 had a conflict of the same 
relative size occurred in the United States.  Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 
8, at 411.  To put this figure in perspective, 620,000 American soldiers died in the 
Civil War, the bloodiest war in American history to date.  In contrast, 644,000 sol-
diers have died in all the other wars that America has fought, combined. Civil War 
Facts, http://www.civilwar.org/education/civil-war-casualties.html 
[https://perma.cc/CE37-MMCN] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
70 See also CIARAN MACAIRT, THE MCGURK’S BAR BOMBING: COLLUSION, COVER-
UP AND A CAMPAIGN FOR TRUTH 64 (2013) (noting that “[a]s the security situation 
continued to deteriorate, hard-liners in the Unionist Party pressed (Prime Minister) 
Brian Faulkner to adopt much tougher measures, including the introduction of in-
ternment without trial”). 
71 More Information About: The Troubles, BBC HISTORY, available at http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles [perma.cc/8ZZN-XHFN] (last visited Mar. 30, 
2016). 
72 See MacAirt at 82-86 (describing how the British Government criticized news 
reports for their political bias when reporting the violence, and pressured the Army 
to take a more aggressive stance in managing the media.  Pro-Republican press was 
described as “terrorist propaganda,” while Whitehall’s information strategy was 
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loyalist paramilitants, however, were often not similarly labeled.  
Since the international community first endeavored to define 
terrorism, there has always been debate on whether organized, 
armed struggle by national liberation groups constituted 
terrorism.73  Particularly during the time of the Troubles, the 
definition of what constitutes terrorism was far from clear.74  
However, the August 2004 United Nations resolution, Resolution 
1566, defines terrorism in a way that can leave no doubt that, at least 
in present day opinion, the non-state militant groups on both sides 
of the struggle in Northern Ireland engaged in terrorism.  The 
resolution states that:  
criminal acts, including [those] against civilians, committed 
with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or 
taking of hostages, with the purpose to provide a state of 
terror in the general public or in a group of person or 
particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act, and all other acts which 
constitute . . . terrorism are under no circumstances 
justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature . . 
. .75 
The issue that many in Northern Ireland now have with the 
decision to label the paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland as 
terrorists is not, however, based on whether their conduct fits the 
definition.  Rather, some have now suggested that perhaps the 
labeling was a calculated attempt to circumvent the Geneva 
Conventions and other bodies of humanitarian law regulating 
                                                     
designed to increase support for the Security Forces and diminish popular enthusi-
asm for the Catholic paramilitaries.). 
73 See PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 383-
84 (201) (3discussing the debate over the definition of a terrorist and the argument 
that armed struggle posed by national liberation groups (of which the IRA is argu-
able a member) is not terrorism).  Others argue that any definition that implies that 
attacks on civilians could be excused in cases of armed resistance was insufficient. 
Also of note is the discussion of the idea of “state terrorism” in which a government 
might also be guilty of terrorism if it uses violence against civilians.  Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 385. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 
1110 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:3 
 
conduct in war.76  Similarly, the use of the phrase “the Troubles” to 
describe the period of conflict in Northern Ireland is thought by 
some to be an attempt to downplay the validity of what was in 
actuality a war,77 thereby also circumventing a need to abide by 
wartime rules and restrictions.  The idea that governments would 
use labels to deny the existence of an organized armed conflict is not 
new.  Rather, as Sandesh Sivakumaran discusses in his article on 
armed opposition groups and humanitarian law, “even when there 
is a reasonable claim that there is a protracted armed conflict, 
governments often have denied the existence of a conflict, making 
dialogue with the parties about the application of humanitarian law 
rather problematic. . . .”78  
Humanitarian law deals with the law of armed conflict, or the 
laws of war.79  More specifically, the Geneva Conventions 
“regulate[] the conduct of armed conflict and seek[] to limit its 
effects.  They specifically protect people who are not taking part in 
the hostilities.”80  If the British government had declared a state of 
civil war, then it would have been bound by international 
agreements to minimize harm to civilians, protect wounded and sick 
soldiers regardless of their side in the conflict, and treat prisoners of 
war according to customary standards.81  However, by intentionally 
failing to declare that an armed conflict existed, the British never felt 
                                                     
76 See MacAirt at 78, fn. 4, (“Just as we contest our shared history, so too do we 
contest what we call periods in. our history.  Many Unionists would decry the use 
of the word “war” to describe the three decades of conflict in Norther of Ireland 
from the late 1960s.  Instead they would use the epithet “the Troubles” as “war” 
would confer some form of legitimacy to what they would see as a breakdown of 
law and order.”); see also Interview with Daniel Holder, Director, Committee for the 
Administration of Justice, Belfast, Northern Ireland (June 2013).  
77 See MacAirt at 78, fn. 4, (further explaining that “Republicans view the con-
flict as a war against oppression and a battle for freedom” and not an uprising or a 
“breakdown of law and order”). 
78 Id. at 78 (describing the internal policy to “fight terrorism with terrorism”); 
see also PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 1500 
(2013).  
79 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 61-62 
(2013). 
80 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, (Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-
and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conven-
tions.htm [perma.cc/M3MW-EC27]. 
81 Id. (noting the Contentions’ enforcement of stringent rules with correspond-
ing ramifications to protect against “grave breaches”). 
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obligated to instruct their soldiers to abide by the Conventions, and 
indeed would have been found in violation of them.  
The IRA, meanwhile, issued an official statement declaring a 
“war of attrition” on Great Britain, announcing that they would 
continue fighting until Ulster could be politically independent and 
free to rejoin the Republic of Ireland.82  Specifically, the IRA 
explained that its goal was: “not to destroy the enemy, for that is 
utopian, but it is indeed to force him, through a prolonged war of 
psychological and physical attrition, to abandon our territory due to 
exhaustion and isolation.”83  Prominent members of paramilitary 
groups were relatively well known; they founded and/or endorsed 
their political parties and took part in political processes.84  Often, 
the groups took public responsibility through the media for the 
deaths that their factions inflicted.85  They also hosted scheduled 
training camps, marches and activities, maintained law and order in 
their communities,86 and even published manuscripts, such as the 
                                                     
82 Ignacio Cuenca-Sanchez, The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the 
IRA, 19 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 3 289, 295 (2007). 
83 Id.  
84 See, e.g., Saville Inquiry into Bloody Sunday, BBC HISTORY, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/saville_inquiry_into_bloody_sunday 
[https://perma.cc/72NZ-Q7YA] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (describing testimony 
of witnesses to Bloody Sunday, including “that of Sinn Fein's chief negotiator Mar-
tin McGuinness.  He confirmed in his statement to the inquiry that he was second-
in-command of the IRA in Derry at the time of the Bloody Sunday shootings, the 
first time he had acknowledged his IRA membership.  At the time, McGuinness 
was the serving education minister in the devolved Northern Irish government.”).   
85 See, e.g., Finucane v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 (2003), available 
at http://amnesties-prosecution-public-interest.co.uk/themainevent/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2014/10/Finucane-v-United-Kingdom.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HAF4-Z94] (stating that a man “telephoned the press and stated 
that the illegal loyalist paramilitary group the Ulster Freedom Fighters . . . claimed 
responsibility for killing Patrick Finucane . . . .”).  
86 Joshua Hammer, In Northern Ireland, Getting Past the Troubles, SMITHSONIAN 
MAGAZINE (March 2009), available at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-
places/in-northern-ireland-getting-past-the-troubles-52862004/?no-ist (“During 
the Troubles, IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries functioned as neighborhood security 
forces, often keeping the two sides at bay.”). 
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Green Book, which was distributed to all IRA volunteers.87  Fighters 
on both sides received military-style funerals when they died.88  
In short, there were clear actors in the Troubles on both sides.89  
Although differentiating these actors from the general population 
would have been difficult and time consuming, and inevitably 
involve tragic mistakes, the British government could also have 
focused exclusively on attacking the known forces of the sectarian 
groups and made minimizing the destruction of civilian life a 
priority.  The British government could have taken appropriate 
steps to mitigate its interference with the human rights of its own 
citizens in Northern Ireland.  The British government could, in short, 
have made efforts to retain transparency and abide by its 
international responsibilities.  Instead, by labeling the entire 
scenario as ‘terrorism,’ the government dove into the fray to the 
point of inflicting its own terrorist acts by attacking civilians,90 as 
discussed in more detail in the following Section.91  The British 
government escalated a situation that would have massive 
repercussions on its counter-terrorism activities decades into the 
future.   
                                                     
87 RANDALL D. LAW, TERRORISM: A HISTORY (2009). 
88 See Michael Stone Kills Three at IRA Funeral, BBC HISTORY, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/michael_stone_kills_three_at_ira_funer-
als [https://perma.cc/9857-HDE2] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (discussing several 
funerals for both Catholic and Protestant forces).  
89 See Violence in the Troubles, BBC HISTORY, available at http://www. 
bbc.co.uk/history/topics/troubles_violence [https://perma.cc/B5RH-67ND] (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2016) (differentiating between civilian deaths and deaths of para-
militaries and military forces); see also Joshua Hammer, In Northern Ireland, Getting 
Past the Troubles, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (March 2009), available at 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/in-northern-ireland-getting-
past-the-troubles-52862004/?no-ist (noting Martin McGuiness, Gerry Adams and 
Ian Paisley as former commander of the IRA, leader of Sinn Fein and chairman of 
the Democratic Unionist Party, respectively).  
90 See BBC, Violence in the Troubles, (“British agents involved in such organiza-
tions (to capture and/or kill IRA volunteers) occasionally used assassination and 
torture and became involved in criminal enterprises, a fact that lent covert opera-
tions the air of mafia undertakings.  Widespread knowledge – or at least suspicion 
– about the work of British commandos gave rise to the widely held opinion that 
London was conducting a “dirty war” against Irish republicanism in Northern Ire-
land.”).  
91 See infra Part 2.2.  The Bloody Sunday massacre, is one such example of a 
civilian attack during a civil rights movement, arguably designed to deter future 
protests of a similar nature.  
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2.2. The British Forces and International Human Rights Violations 
In 1971, British parliament escalated the already existent 
emergency measures and instituted a policy of “internment,” or 
imprisonment without trial for any and all individuals suspected of 
terrorist activities.92  In January of 1972, in what would infamously 
become known as the Bloody Sunday Massacre, a British Parachute 
regiment attacked a civil rights protest and left thirteen Catholic 
civilians dead.93  In 1973, the Northern Ireland Emergency 
Provisions Act (EPA) was passed, “retain[ing] the government’s 
extensive powers of detention, proscription, entry, search and 
seizure, restrictions on the use of vehicles, the blocking up of roads, 
the closing of licensed premises, and the collection of information 
on security forces.”94  Britain’s use of the EPA’s provision regarding 
the collection of information about paramilitary group activities 
would become particularly influential in the years to come.95  All of 
these events contributed to the increased popularization and 
expansion of anti-government sentiment, predominantly amongst 
Catholics.96   
                                                     
92 See More Information About: The Troubles, BBC HISTORY, available at http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles [perma.cc/ELW7-RECV] (last visited Mar. 30, 
2016) (describing “[t]hirty years of conflict in Northern Ireland, 1968 – 1998.”). 
93 See Archive: Bloody Sunday, BBC HISTORY, available at http://www. 
bbc.co.uk/history/bloody_sunday [perma.cc/ELW7-RECV] (last visited Mar. 30, 
2016) (noting that an initial government inquiry exonerated the army of all wrong-
doing, but an independent public inquiry ordered by Prime Minister Tony Blair in 
1998 and finally reported in 2010 “established the innocence of the victims and laid 
responsibility for what happened on the army”).  
94 Donahue, supra note 40, at 4.  
95 See infra, p. 22, discussing the use of the EPA as a basis for a variety of judicial 
processes.  
96 Shawn Pogatchnik, Soldier Arrested Over Rile in 1972 Bloody Sunday Massacre, 
THE WORLD POST, (Nov. 11, 2015), available at http://www.huffingtonpost. com/en-
try/bloody-sunday-massacre-arrest_us_5642d50de4b08cda3486a546 
[https://perma.cc/F3TG-PE7S] (“Bloody Sunday was a threshold event in North-
ern Ireland's conflict, driving radicalized Catholics into the ranks of the outlawed 
IRA and its campaign to force Northern Ireland out of the United Kingdom.”); see 
also CIARAN MACAIRT, THE MCGURK’S BAR BOMBING: COLLUSION, COVER-UP AND A 
CAMPAIGN FOR TRUTH, introduction (2013) (describing the aversion of Sir Harry 
Tuzo, General Officer commanding the British Army in Northern Ireland, to intern-
ment policies, as he knew they would incite anger and lead to further violence 
amongst the general populace in Northern Ireland). 
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The EPA was initially intended to be a temporary measure.97  
However, in response to the “terrorist hostilities,” the EPA was 
renewed.98  It eventually formed the basis for a judicial process that 
established certain crimes as “scheduled offenses,” punishable 
regardless of the motive of the perpetrator, or any other 
surrounding circumstances of the alleged criminal activity.99  This in 
turn gave rise to the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act, which instituted the use of now infamous “Diplock 
Courts”: emergency trials held without a jury, often late at night in 
the bowels of the jails.100  Diplock Courts became prevalent because 
of their speed in convicting suspected paramilitaries, particularly 
Catholics.101  Despite local criticism that the courts symbolized “the 
mainstay of an emergency regime which many have condemned as 
an affront to civil liberties,”102 the legislation imposing the Diplock 
Courts has been renewed in a steady line of anti-terrorist legislation.  
Distressingly, the courts remain available for use to this day, should 
emergency situations arise, in much the same format as the courts 
of the 1970’s and 80’s.103 
                                                     
97 Donahue, supra note 40, at 4. 
98 Id. at 7. 
99 Id.   
100 See Christopher K. Connolly, Living on the Past: the Role of Truth Commissions 
in Post-Conflict Societies and the Case Study of Northern Ireland, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
401, 415 [perma.cc/74WC-SVMJ] (describing Diplock courts as an abusive tactic, 
“employed liberally, especially against the Catholic community”). 
101 Id.  
102 Sean Doran & John Jackson, Diplock Courts: A Model For British Justice?, THE 
INDEPENDENT ( Sept. 12, 1995), http://www.independent.co.uk/money/ spend-
save/diplock-courts-a-model-for-british-justice-1600830.html                       
[perma.cc/RMN6-F2W4]. 
103 In 2000, the Prevention of Terrorism Act was replicated by the aptly named 
Terrorism Act 2000.  This was then renewed with the Terrorism Act 2006, ensuring 
that the Diplock Courts remained legal until 2007.  Donahue, supra note 40.  In 2007, 
the courts were officially abolished, however, the practice continued, and in 2011, 
Northern Ireland’s Secretary of State announced that it would continue for the fore-
seeable future, due to “political[] convenien[ce]” and the “dissident threat.”  Barry 
McCaffrey, Non-Jury Trials “Form of Normality,” THE DETAIL, 1 (11 April 2011), 
http://www.thedetail.tv/issues/5/diplock-courts-story/non-jury-trials-form-of-
normality (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) [perma.cc/YT35-MXQD].  Since its inception, 
over 10,000 defendants have passed through the Diplock system, amounting to ap-
proximately one third of all serious criminal cases coming out of Northern Ireland.  
Sean Doran & John Jackson, Diplock Courts: A Model For British Justice?, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 12, 1995), http://www.independent. co.uk/money/spend-
save/diplock-courts-a-model-for-british-justice-1600830.html [perma.cc/RMN6-
F2W4]. 
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The Diplock Courts were also criticized for serving to cover up 
illegal government activity.  In 1982, the non-jury courts were used 
to clear members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary police force of 
shooting six unarmed Catholic civilians.104  The courts also allegedly 
turned a blind eye towards police methods of interrogation that 
amounted to cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment.105  Though 
unrelated to the courts, allegations of unofficial “shoot-to-kill” 
policies, in which British forces and the Ulster Police Force were 
instructed to kill, rather than incapacitate or simply physically 
detain suspects, spread rapidly.106  These methods were confirmed 
years later, in international court hearings.107  Finally, collusion was 
rampant.  There was widespread sentiment that British forces would 
look on and do nothing as Catholics were killed by Protestant 
paramilitaries.108  More directly, British forces infiltrated the 
                                                     
104 Barry McCaffrey, Non-Jury Trials “Form of Normality,” THE DETAIL, 4 (11 
April 2011), http://www.thedetail.tv/issues/5/diplock-courts-story/non-jury-
trials-form-of-normality (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) [perma.cc/YT35-MXQD]. 
105 Sean Doran & John Jackson, Diplock Courts: A Model For British Justice?, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 12, 1995), http://www.independent.co.uk/money/ spend-
save/diplock-courts-a-model-for-british-justice-1600830.html                             
[perma.cc/RMN6-F2W4] (noting that “the courts were accused by some of turning 
a blind eye to dubious police interrogation practices that routinely produced a pros-
ecutor's ticket to conviction in the shape of a confession”); see also Ian Cobain, Guy 
Grandjean, Maggie O’Kane, Teresa Smith, An RUC Interrogator Speaks: Northern Ire-
land’s Forced Confessions Revealed, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2010) 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/video/ 2010/oct/11/northern-ireland-police-
torture?CMP=twt_gu [perma.cc/2YBW-2UEV] (noting that: 
[h]undreds of men and women found guilty of terrorism during the Trou-
bles in Northern Ireland are planning to appeal.  Most of them were con-
victed on the basis of confessions they say were beaten out of them by 
police.  A Guardian investigation has uncovered evidence from former 
police interrogators that the brutality was routine and sanctioned at a very 
high level.). 
106 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 415-16 (“In the mid-1980s, the 
Stalker Investigation into the actions of the RUC and British Army allegedly uncov-
ered the existence of a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy in regard to members of the IRA.”). 
107 See, e.g., PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 
922-25 (2013) (articulating the judgment in McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, in 
which the Court notes that all four British soldiers shot to kill IRA agents in Gibral-
tar after receiving inaccurate information about an alleged car bomb).   
108 See Martin Melaugh, Collusion- Chronology of events in the Stevens Inquiries, 
CAIN WEB SERVICE, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/chron.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E4JE-8J4W] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016); and Martin Melaugh, 
Abstracts an Organizations – “F”, CAIN WEB SERVICE, available at 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/forgan.htm#fru [https://perma.cc/J36L-
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paramilitary forces as secret agents and then assisted them in 
destroying each other,109 recruited mainly Protestant paramilitaries 
as spies,110 and supplied Protestant forces with British Army 
weaponry which was then used in attacks on Catholics.111  Any 
                                                     
HLLB] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (noting that Brian Nelson, a loyalist paramilitary 
and double agent for the British, was believed to have been involved in at least 
fifteen killings, fifteen attempted killings, and sixty-two conspiracies to kill during 
the two years that he was handled by the British, but they failed to intervene to 
protect any of the UDA’s victims, believing Nelson’s information was too valuable 
to compromise.  Republicans claim that the agency handling Nelson was colluding 
with loyalist paramilitaries); See also, infra Part 3.2.1. (discussing Pat Finucane’s 
death).  British forces were aware of death threats against Finucane but did not es-
tablish any means of protecting the attorney, leading to accusations of collusion 
between loyalist paramilitaries and the forces that killed Finucane.  See Martin 
Melaugh, Collusion – Chronology of Events in the Stevens Inquiries, CAIN WEB 
SERVICES, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/chron.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GA8Z-E8ZC] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016); see also Martin 
Melaugh, Stevens Enquiry: Overview and Recommendations, 17 April 2003, CAIN WEB 
Services, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/stevens3/ 
stevens3summary.htm [https://perma.cc/5P2S-FV6L] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016); 
see generally Britain’s Secret Terror Deals: ‘Truly disturbing’ BBC Panorama allegations 
of collusion must be fully investigated, says Amnesty International, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, 
(May 28, 2015), available at http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-
ireland/britains-secret-terror-deals-truly-disturbing-bbc-panorama-allegations-of-
collusion-must-be-fully-investigated-says-amnesty-international-31261593.html 
[https://perma.cc/8CJX-EHTX]. 
109 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 428 n.191 (describing that “Rob-
ert Hamill, a Catholic youth, was beaten to death by a Loyalist gang in 1997, alleg-
edly within sight of an RUC patrol that failed to intervene.”); see also Robert Hamill 
Inquiry, http://www.roberthamillinquiry.org [perma.cc/TT65-ETS4] (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2006).  Rosemary Nelson, a human rights lawyer, was killed when a bomb 
attached to her car exploded in 1999.  Prior to the murder she had been the recipient 
of threats and abuse from RUC officers.  See Rosemary Nelson Inquiry, 
http://www.rosemarynelsoninquiry.org [perma.cc/Y9VU-FWLS] (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2006).  Billy Wright, jailed leader of the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) par-
amilitary organization, was murdered by Republican fellow-prisoners under sus-
picious circumstances in 1997.  See Billy Wright Inquiry, http://www.billywright-
inquiry.org [perma.cc/7WLH-MU9R] (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
110 See Melaugh, (explaining that the Force Research Unit, a special unit of Brit-
ish Military Intelligence, sought to identify and recruit members of Republican and 
Loyalist paramilitary groups who could be persuaded to work as double agents for 
the Unit). 
111 Ian Cobain, UK Accused of Helping to Supply Arms for Northern Ireland Loyalist 
Killings, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2012), available at http://www.theguard-
ian.com/uk/2012/oct/15/uk-arms-northern-ireland-loyalist-massacre 
[https://perma.cc/7J7U-9SXK] (“The Ministry of Defence and the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (PSNI) are being sued by relatives of six men murdered by a loy-
alist gunman . . . .  The authorities are alleged to have assisted – or at least turned a 
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available methodology “became seen as a critical part of the ongoing 
fight against terrorism.”112  Naturally, everything was allegedly 
done in the interest of stabilizing the region and procuring national 
security. 
The summary of human rights abuses that the British Armed 
Forces engaged in is not only relevant as background information, 
it is important for understanding the history of the conflict.  The 
impact of litigating the cases of victims who were subjected to these 
particular abuses would no longer carry the same legal force of 
weight if the remnants of these types of strategies were no longer in 
use by the British government today.  However, as this paper will 
explore further, it is likely that the United Kingdom continues to 
invade the rights of its citizens to privacy, fair trials, independent 
investigations and the right to be free of arbitrary internment.113  
For example, in 2010, litigants in two cases (one involving 
mortgage fraud and another an armed robbery at Heathrow 
Airport) lost the right to a trial by jury due to the remnants of the 
Diplock Court system.114  They appealed the decisions.115  In July of 
2013, a non-governmental organization, Privacy International, 
                                                     
blind eye – as about 300 automatic rifles and pistols, hundreds of grenades and an 
estimated 30,000 rounds of ammunition were smuggled into Belfast in 1987.”). 
112 Donahue, supra note 40.   
113 See Concerns and Recommendations on the United Kingdom, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (June 22, 2015), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/22/ hu-
man-rights-watch-concerns-and-recommendations-united-kingdom 
[https://perma.cc/W9JZ-6SUV] (“Significant evidence that UK authorities were 
complicit in torture and rendition to torture is already available.  In 2009, Human 
Rights Watch documented complicity by the UK security services in torture in Pa-
kistan.  In September 2011, our research also revealed that the UK security services 
were complicit in the rendition of two prominent opponents of the Gaddafi regime, 
Sami al-Saadi and Abdul Hakim Belhadj, to Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, de-
spite knowledge that they were likely to be tortured.  Criminal investigations into 
both cases have been ongoing for several years with no public statements as to 
when they will be concluded and if anyone will be prosecuted.”); see infra Part 4 
(suggesting that because many known counter-terrorism measures of the Troubles 
violate international law, and still others have remained undisclosed due to gov-
ernment fears of compromising current counter-terrorism efforts, it is reasonable to 
suspect that current measures also infringe upon the internationally recognized 
rights of civilians).  
114 Barry McCaffrey, Non-Jury Trials “Form of Normality,” THE DETAIL, 4-5 (April 
11, 2011), http://www.thedetail.tv/issues/5/diplock-courts-story/non-jury-tri-
als-form-of-normality (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) [perma.cc/YT35-MXQD].  
115 Id.  
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launched legal action against the British government over alleged 
privacy infringements.116  The suit alleges that the “UK Government 
is accessing wide-ranging intelligence information from the U.S. and 
is conducting mass surveillance on citizens across the UK,” and 
furthermore that the government’s “expansive spying regime is 
seemingly operated outside of the rule of law, lacks any 
accountability, and is neither necessary nor proportionate.”117  The 
progress of the proceedings is unknown; although initially filed in 
administrative court, the plaintiffs were forced to file the claim with 
the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (“IPT”) at the government’s 
insistence.118  The IPT is a secretive body that does not need to 
publish its proceedings or justify the reasons for its decisions.119  The 
last voluntary publication the IPT made was on a preliminary point 
of law, adjacent to a larger proceeding, dated July 24, 2013.120  
Transparent publications (or rulings) regarding citizens’ rights 
to privacy, trials by jury, and other matters of human rights could 
have an enormous impact on current proceedings in the United 
Kingdom.  A body of precedent by the tribunals involved would at 
least establish the standard by which these types of alleged 
violations are adjudged.  Several other Western countries that 
allegedly engage in similar practices might also take note of such 
precedent, were it to exist.  The historical cases of the Troubles are 
an exemplar of human-rights related issues, and, if litigated, could 
establish a body of jurisprudence with consistency and clarity.  To 
be sure, this would be an undertaking of great depth.  However, it 
could also prove that great consequences exist for the countries that 
continue to commit such violations.  The outcome of a 
                                                     
116 Privacy International Files Legal Challenge against UK Government over Mass 
Surveillance Programmes, PRIVACY INT’L 1 (July 8, 2013), available at https://www.pri-
vacyinternational.org/press-releases/privacy-international-files-legal-challenge-
against-uk-government-over-mass [perma.cc/HE39-794R]. 
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119 Key IPT Rulings, INVESTIGATORY POWERS, available at http://www.ipt-
uk.com/section.aspx?pageid=8 [https://perma.cc/N268-L7QU] (last visited Mar. 
30, 2016) (clarifying that the IPT is actually required “not to disclose material pro-
vided to it which would threaten the national interest, national security, operations 
against serious crime or any functions of the intelligence agencies”).  
120 In the publication, the IPT declared that the covert recording of an interview 
voluntarily given by a member of the public to a public authority figure did not 
constitute “surveillance” under the meaning of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act of 2000.  Id.  
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comprehensive body of jurisprudence condemning this behavior, at 
least in its most egregious forms, would serve to place shame and 
condemnation on present day over-broad counter-terrorism activity 
as it impacts citizen-civilian human rights.  
The impact of counter-terrorism measures upon the rights of 
armed opposition groups in accordance with humanitarian law is 
more complex.  Today, as was the case during the conflict in 
Northern Ireland, suspected terrorists’ rights are more easily 
infringed upon than civilians’ rights because of their identification 
as “terrorists.”  As discussed above, the question of whether an 
armed conflict even exists against or between such groups can be a 
convoluted issue.  The natural consequence of such a question is 
whether then, as now, a government engaged with those it identifies 
as “terrorists” is required to at least attempt to abide by 
humanitarian law whenever possible.  Further at issue is whether 
then, and now, such governments actively seek to evade the use of 
humanitarian law to regulate their own conduct in the conflict.  
Though modern allegations of human rights abuses had been 
swirling for some time, in 2010 evidence surfaced that the 
government of the United Kingdom was complicit in the internment 
of UK citizens in Guantanamo Bay.121  British officials were also 
collusive in CIA-led torture, including sleep-deprivation techniques 
and water boarding for purposes of interrogation and other 
reasons.122  At the end of 2013, the Gibson Report was published.  
This internal investigative document announced that British 
soldiers were clearly aware of, and complicit in, such activities for 
years.123  The Report also absolved the British soldiers and their 
superiors of any burden to report the torturous acts of other non-
British actors, justifying this conclusion under the Geneva 
                                                     
121 Richard Norton-Taylor & Ian Cobain, MI6 ‘Turned Blind Eye’ to Torture of 
Rendered Detainees, Finds Gibson Report, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/19/gibson-report-mi6-de-
tainees-torture-cooperated [perma.cc/PN3P-69W8]. 
122 Id.  
123 See Concerns and Recommendations on the United Kingdom, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (June 22, 2015), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/22/hu-
man-rights-watch-concerns-and-recommendations-united-kingdom 
[https://perma.cc/W9JZ-6SUV] (“While the report does not reach any firm con-
clusions, it strongly suggests that UK security services, at least in some cases, were 
aware that detainees were being tortured by foreign governments yet continued to 
engage with them.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 
1120 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:3 
 
Convention.124  Many human rights groups have questioned the 
extent of the Report’s accuracy and bias.125  In a statement that may 
have sounded eerily familiar to some in Northern Ireland, Jack 
Straw, the former foreign secretary, urged Parliament never to 
forget the context in which the collusion was committed, and noted 
that “the allegations of torture arose in the ‘aftermath of the world's 
most appalling terrorist atrocity ever, on 11 September 2001.”126  In 
short, Straw’s message was that even extreme violations of human 
rights could be justified, when terrorism is involved.  
Perhaps tellingly, the Gibson report was never completed after 
startling evidence regarding the treatment of Libyan dissidents was 
uncovered.  That revelation resulted in orders for the termination of 
the Report project and an internal police investigation into the 
Libyan matter.127  Due to this about-face, many have again expressed 
concerns that the issue will not be adequately addressed due to bias.  
First, those being investigated felt that the writers of the Gibson 
Report had ulterior motives,128 and those writers again made the 
                                                     
124 See Richard Norton-Taylor & Ian Cobain, MI6 ‘Turned Blind Eye’ to Torture 
of Rendered Detainees, Finds Gibson Report, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/19/gibson-report-mi6-de-
tainees-torture-cooperated [perma.cc/PN3P-69W8] (“MI6 officers were under no 
obligation to report breaches of the Geneva conventions.”). 
125 See Concerns and Recommendations on the United Kingdom, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (June 22, 2015), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/22/ hu-
man-rights-watch-concerns-and-recommendations-united-kingdom 
[https://perma.cc/W9JZ-6SUV] (noting that the Gibson Report “was shelved by 
the government in January 2012 before it had concluded its work or questioned any 
witnesses, after nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) strongly criticised its in-
adequate powers and lack of independence.”). 
126 Richard Norton-Taylor & Ian Cobain, MI6 ‘Turned Blind Eye’ to Torture of 
Rendered Detainees, Finds Gibson Report, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/19/gibson-report-mi6-de-
tainees-torture-cooperated [perma.cc/PN3P-69W8]. 
127 Id.  Of the two Libyan cases, one “has reached an out-of-court settlement of 
£2.2m from the British government.” In the other case, the plaintiff is seeking an 
apology in the courts, and a symbolic compensation of £3.  Id.  The matter is as of 
yet unresolved.  Id. 
128 See Kent Roach, Public Inquiries as an Attempt to Fill Accountability Gaps Left 
by Judicial and Legislative Review, in CRITICAL DEBATES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM JUD. 
R., 183, 195 (Fergal F. Davis & Fiona de Londras eds., 2014) (“[T]he fact that Gibson 
had been a judge did not guarantee that he would be perceived to be independent.  
Controversy immediately arose over Gibson’s appointment because he had served 
as an Intelligence Services Commissioner (ISC) from 2006 until his appointment to 
head the Detainee Inquiry in 2010.  The ISC has statutory oversight duties with re-
spect to covert surveillance and covert human sources used by the security services, 
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same accusations once the investigative procedure was 
internalized.129  Indeed, “[d]espite promises by David Cameron and 
the former justice secretary, Ken Clarke, that investigations would 
be continued by an independent, judge-led inquiry, the government 
. . . handed over the task to the intelligence and security committee 
of selected MPs and peers.”130  The Gibson Report thus concluded 
with unanswered questions in bold-faced print about the level of 
involvement and participation in the torture that may have been 
committed by British soldiers.131  Even though it identified over 200 
reported cases of British involvement in illegal torture of detainees, 
and selected forty of those cases as deserving “particular attention” 
none have been addressed.132  
This potential obstruction of justice echoes the allegations that 
the British government faced during the Troubles.  Many of the 
counter-terrorism activities allegedly used then appear to still be in 
use now, albeit with more modern technology.  The government’s 
                                                     
including otherwise illegal actions outside the United Kingdom.  Both the parlia-
mentary opposition and civil society groups raised concerns that Gibson may have 
in confidential reports already reviewed some of the matters that the inquiry would 
review.  Clive Stafford Smith on behalf of the Reprieve suggested that Gibson might 
even be a valuable witness before his inquiry, and that applying the judicial stand-
ards of bias, he should recuse himself.”). 
129 See UK: Broken Promise on Torture Inquiry, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH  (Dec. 21, 
2013), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/21/uk-broken-promise-
torture-inquiry [https://perma.cc/43Y5-J9VV] (noting that “[t]he government an-
nounced on December 19, though, that it would hand responsibility for further in-
vestigations to the Intelligence and Security Committee rather than establishing a 
judicial inquiry that addresses all the shortcomings of the Gibson inquiry;” lament-
ing that “[t]he Intelligence and Security Committee has a poor track record of hold-
ing the intelligence agencies to account for their role in renditions and overseas tor-
ture. . . .”; and quoting Benjamin Ward, the deputy director of the Europe and 
Central Asia division at Human Rights Watch, in stating that “[t]he Intelligence and 
Security Committee lacks the independence, transparency, and credibility to inves-
tigate these extremely serious issues.  The serious questions raised by the Gibson 
report and the wider evidence of UK complicity in overseas torture can only be 
resolved by an independent judicial inquiry.”). 
130 Richard Norton-Taylor & Ian Cobain, MI6 ‘Turned Blind Eye’ to Torture of 
Rendered Detainees, Finds Gibson Report, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/19/gibson-report-mi6-de-
tainees-torture-cooperated [perma.cc/PN3P-69W8]. 
131 See id. (“Gibson's concerns are reflected in a series of passages, set in bold 
print in his report, identifying issues described as ones ‘the inquiry would have 
wished to investigate.’”). 
132 Id.  
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active participation in human rights violations linked to the 
Troubles has hopefully ceased, but the government nonetheless 
continues to deny requests for open police investigations, reports by 
the Historical Inquires Team (created for the express purpose of 
reporting on historical cases), trials, and inquests.133   
Interestingly, further evidence has surfaced that many of the 
same intelligence-gathering techniques used by the British Forces 
during the Troubles remain in use today.  Due to this fact, often, 
when a Troubles-related trial is pursued, the government refuses to 
turnover armed forces’ documentation of their Troubles-related 
actions, as they claim the documents are too sensitive and may 
jeopardize the safety of current military operations.134   
This declaration obviously reveals the similarity between the 
strategies and information-gathering processes employed during 
the Troubles and those employed against terrorists today.  That 
likeness also suggests that jurisprudence arising out of the fact 
patterns of Troubles cases would also be applicable to modern day 
terrorism cases, and thus could impact how terrorism is addressed 
today.  Because Great Britain and other Western countries continue 
to refuse basic judicial rights to recompense citizens who suffer from 
collateral damage wreaked in the pursuit of suspected terrorists (or 
if deceased, their families), a body of jurisprudence from a respected 
domestic court would not only resolve the injustices of the past, but 
be binding on the actions of current counter-terrorism operations as 
well.  As a respected system of justice, the British courts’ rulings 
could impact not only their own country’s acts, but by condemning 
such acts, could also influence the international sphere and 
encourage others to follow suit.  
                                                     
133 The DPP must establish criminal trial proceedings, but has repeatedly de-
clined to prosecute.  An aggrieved family member cannot call for a criminal trial 
independently of the government.  
134 For example, the ECtHR summary of the case of Pearse Jordan, at para-
graph 32(a), holds that certain categories of information would be withheld on 
“grounds of national security.”  Jordan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94, 94 
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8 (2011) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/     
pages/search.aspx?i=001-59450#{"itemid":["001-59450"]} [perma.cc/B6L6-TFJJ].  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/6
 
2016] THE “TROUBLES” IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1123 
 
 
3.  ATTEMPTS TO LITIGATE TROUBLES’ CASES 
3.1. Domestic Struggles 
As discussed above, a body of jurisprudence would prove 
invaluable to current human rights activists and the survivors of the 
Troubles, who are both still reeling from the violence.  The reasons 
for the absence of any jurisprudence in this area is not due to a lack 
of effort on the part of potential plaintiffs.  Though instrumental in 
attaining peace, the Good Friday Agreement (also known as the 
Belfast Agreement) instituted no comprehensive mechanism to deal 
with the seemingly endless body of un-litigated claims that the 
events of the Troubles left in its wake.  Today, a hapless 
conglomeration of official organizations takes a piece-meal 
approach towards reconciling the judicial claims.  Known by some 
who deal with the offices as the “package of measures,” the services 
offered by offices such as the Historical Enquiries Team (“HET”), 
Office of the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland, (“OPONI”), 
Coroners’ Office, Police Service of Northern Ireland (“PSNI”, known 
formerly as the Royal Ulster Constabulary or “RUC”), and Public 
Prosecution Service (“PPS”) have been likened to a leaking wall, 
struggling to hold back the tide of litigation.135  Whenever one crack 
in the wall grows too large, and the flood of cases can no longer be 
contained, another acronym is slapped on to address the problem.  
Forgotten and neglected cases trickle through everywhere, 
however, and overall the approach is failing.136  Although this poetic 
and apt metaphor was articulated by a community service center 
within Belfast, international non-governmental organizations also 
agree with this assessment.  For example, “Amnesty 
[International]’s report shows that families have been failed by 
processes conducted by the Police Service of Northern Ireland’s 
Historical Enquiries Team, the Office of the Police Ombudsman and 
various coroners’ inquests . . . .”137 
                                                     
135 Analogy attributed to Shauna Carberry.  Interview with Shauna Carberry, 
Employee, Relatives for Justice, in Belfast, Northern Ireland (June 2013).  
136 Id.  
137 Northern Ireland: Amnesty Slams Failure to Deal with Past, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL UK PRESS RELEASES (Sept. 12, 2013, 12:00AM), http://www.am-
nesty.org.uk/press-releases/northern-ireland-amnesty-slams-failure-deal-past 
[perma.cc/KN8B-TK9F].  
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As a result of this unorganized and stagnant situation, some 
victims and their families, who are anxious to learn more about the 
exact circumstances of their loved ones’ deaths, have engaged in 
Public Inquiries; unofficial presentations of evidence at community 
centers or town halls, designed to encourage media attention for 
their cases.  The primary goal in such an Inquiry is not to determine 
a perpetrator, but rather to present evidence in such a way that 
suggests the government prematurely closed the investigations 
without aptly considering pertinent evidence.138  
One such Public Inquiry addressed the murder of Gerard 
Lawlor.  His is the most recent sectarian killing to date in Northern 
Ireland, and many hope the last and final murder in the style of the 
Troubles.139  His case was also one of the first to be investigated by 
the PSNI, the newly assembled Northern Irish police force meant to 
take the place of the RUC,140 which was overtly sympathetic to the 
Protestant cause and over 92% Protestant in make-up at times.141  
Significantly, the shooting also came after the implementation of the 
United Kingdom Human Rights Act in 2000.142  The Act adopts 
many of the provisions of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (“ECHR”), and declares unlawful any act by a public body or 
official that contradicts the ECHR.143  As the ECHR requires a 
                                                     
138 See e.g., Ian Cobain, UK Accused of Helping to Supply Arms for Northern Ireland 
Loyalist Kilings (Oct. 15, 2012), available at http://www.theguardian.com/ 
uk/2012/oct/15/uk-arms-northern-ireland-loyalist-massacre (describing the mo-
tivations of family members who have brought suit against the Ministry of Defence 
and the Police Service of Northern Ireland as an “aim to uncover the truth”). 
139 See generally Gerard Lawlor Community Inquiry, Report and Recommen-
dations 2 (Nov. 2012) available at http://relativesforjustice.com/wp-content/             
uploads/2012/11/Gerard_Report_2012-WEB1.pdf [perma.cc/ZF5D-MJHU]. 
140 Id.  
141 The Search for Peace: The Royal Ulster Constabulary, BBC, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/northern_ireland/understanding/pro-
files/ruc.stm [perma.cc/ZF9K-GVT7] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (noting that alle-
gations of collusion between the RUC and Protestant militants continued until the 
force was replaced by the PSNI). 
142 See generally Gerard Lawlor Community Inquiry, Report and Recommen-
dations 2 (Nov. 2012) available at http://relativesforjustice.com/wp-content/           
uploads/2012/11/Gerard_Report_2012-WEB1.pdf [perma.cc/ZF5D-MJHU]. 
143 See “How the Human Rights Act Works,” Liberty Protecting Civil Liberties, Pro-
moting Human Rights, available at https://www.liberty-human-rights. org.uk/hu-
man-rights/what-are-human-rights/human-rights-act/how-human-rights-act-
works [ https://perma.cc/Q3JE-9YWG] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (explaining that 
“[i]t is unlawful for any public authority to act incompatibly with human rights 
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prompt and effective government investigation into potential 
human rights violations, many hoped that in the case of Gerard 
Lawlor, the threat of illegality would ensure that an investigation 
would indeed be forthcoming.  Though this Act would have some 
significance in the government’s handling of other historical cases, 
to the great disappointment of many human rights activists in 
Northern Ireland, it has yet to cause any official effect in the case of 
Gerard Lawlor.144 
In 2002, Lawlor was shot as he walked home from a pub on the 
Antrim Road,145 a well-known thoroughfare through a 
predominantly Catholic neighborhood.146  His location assured his 
attackers that he was likely a Catholic.147  Five other shooting attacks 
on Catholic pedestrians in Catholic neighborhoods occurred that 
night, but the police chose not to investigate them as potentially 
connected, and indeed chose not to investigate one of the attacks 
altogether as no one was harmed (the gun used jammed, so the 
gunmen sped away).  An anonymous witness came forward 
                                                     
(unless under a statutory duty to act in that way), and anyone whose rights have 
been violated can bring court proceedings against the public authority.”). 
144 Id.  The panel of judges at the public inquiry did consider whether ECHR 
Article 2 violations occurred concerning the right to a transparent, independent, 
prompt and effective investigation in cases where the state was implicated in the 
murder.  See infra pp. 50-51.  However, the state has failed to reopen the investiga-
tion, despite the applicability of the UK Human Rights Act.   
145 See Gerard Lawlor Community Inquiry, Report and Recommendations 2 
(Nov. 2012) available at http://relativesforjustice.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/11/Gerard_Report_2012-WEB1.pdf [perma.cc/ZF5D-MJHU]. 
146 See Map, http://www.wesleyjohnston.com/users/ireland/maps/towns/ 
belfast_religion.gif  [https://perma.cc/99WY-MPB3] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) 
(noting that the New Lodge district, which is bordered by the Antrim Road, is a 
predominantly Catholic neighborhood); see also Sean O’Hagan, “Belfast, divided in 
the name of peace,” The Guardian (Jan. 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jan/22/peace-walls-troubles-belfast-
feature [https://perma.cc/QE9N-KEXR] (discussing the sectarian history of the 
Antrim Road, “When I meet local Sinn Féin councillor Conor Maskey in the offices 
of Intercomm, a cross-community, bridge-building organisation in the Antrim 
Road, he tells me that nearly a third of the deaths during the Troubles occurred in 
a square mile radius of where we are sitting.”); JEFFREY A. SLUKA, DEATH SQUAD: THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF STATE TERROR 129, 152 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000). 
147 Id. at 2.  For example, on July 29, 2001, Gavin Brett was shot and killed by 
loyalist gunmen who likely presumed he was a Catholic because he was standing 
at the entrance to a GAA club.  Id.  He was, in fact, a Protestant who was keeping a 
friend company.  Id.  Thus, tragic mistakes based on this kind of assumption have 
been made in the past. 
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through a confidential tip line alleging that she had heard unknown 
men boasting later the same night that Lawlor was killed that “we 
done a hit on the Antrim Road.  We got a wee fenian148 outside the 
Bellevue Arms on the Antrim Road.”149  This tip was not 
investigated or even recorded in the case files.  Police later stated 
that this inaction was due to an effort to protect the witness’s 
identity, but many acquainted with the facts of the case question this 
justification, and scoff that “such a policy beggars belief and negates 
the whole purpose of setting up confidential police hotlines.”150   
In Lawlor’s Inquiry, a panel of reputable judges from a variety 
of NGO’s and international offices unanimously found that the case 
investigation should not have been closed by the Northern Ireland 
police service.151  The family also filed a complaint against the police 
with the Office of the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland, 
alleging possible collusion with the shooters or cover-up of relevant 
information; the complaint has not been received a response.152 
In his article analyzing the potential for a truth commission in 
Northern Ireland, Kevin Connolly aptly describes British attitudes 
towards legal actions against military personnel accused of 
wrongdoing: 
Britain has shown little inclination to allow its military and 
security personnel to face sanctions for offenses carried out 
in Northern Ireland.  In many cases, the British state has 
ignored or actively covered up the role of state agents in past 
violence.  Britain's attitudes towards past state violence are 
                                                     
148 Fenian is a derogative slang term for an Irish Catholic.  See Dictionary.com, 
available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/fenian 
[https://perma.cc/CKF8-G732] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (“(in late Irish legends) 
a member of a group of warriors always ready to defend Ireland against its ene-
mies.”). 
149 See generally Gerard Lawlor Community Inquiry, Report and Recommen-
dations (Nov. 2012) available at http://relativesforjustice.com/wp-content/              
uploads/2012/11/Gerard_Report_2012-WEB1.pdf [perma.cc/ZF5D-MJHU]. 
150 Id. at 13. 
151 Id. at 39 (concluding that the PSNI and Police Ombudsman did not provide 
an effective investigation in compliance with Article 2).  Of course, it is always pos-
sible to debate the independence of such judges and the accuracy of such hearings, 
as they are unofficial and are sponsored by families with obvious biases towards 
the outcomes that they desire.  Again, however, the purpose is not exclusively to 
cultivate an accurate judgment about the case, but also to drum up local support 
for a public inquiry, and to encourage the media to add pressure to the government 
to reopen the case.  
152 Id. at 10. 
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predictable, and difficult to remedy, given that the transition 
in Northern Ireland does not go to the heart of the British 
state.  Britain has little reason or incentive for exposing its 
institutions and individual actors to processes of 
accountability, and to the extent that groups in Northern 
Ireland desire such accountability, they do not enjoy the 
overall political leverage necessary to compel it. 
The case of Gerard Lawlor is not the only example of judicial 
inefficiency and inaction.  The list is virtually endless.  Nearly 
everyone in Northern Ireland either knows someone who was 
killed, or is aware of a family who lost a loved one.  Additional 
unresolved cases include those of Pearse Jordan (suspected to have 
been killed by a British police officer), Denis Brown, Jackie Mailey, 
James Mulvenna, William Hanna (all also suspected to have been 
killed in one incident by several Special Air Services soldiers in the 
British Army), Henry Cunningham, Terrence McCafferty, Sean 
Brown, Rosaleen and Mervyn McDonald, Patrick Eugene Heenan, 
John Doherty, Ciaran Murphy, Bernard O’Hagan, and so many 
others.153  Providing these few names lends a certain concreteness to 
the multitude of unresolved cases, but so many other names could 
have been chosen.  The overall judicial inefficiency has led some 
victims and families of victims to seek assistance outside of the 
United Kingdom all together.  
3.2. International Judgments: The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the Troubles 
The United Kingdom has long exhibited a notorious antipathy 
towards regional European human rights bodies.154  Though 
parliament ratified the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) in 1951, it was 
                                                     
153 Victims Condemn Northern Ireland Troubles Prosecution Call, BBC (Nov. 20, 
2013), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-25021286 (not-
ing a variety of unsolved Troubles’ –related violence cases and quoting the Demo-
cratic Unionist Party’s representative, Jeffrey Donaldson, as saying that “There are 
3,000 unsolved murders in Northern Ireland and those families are entitled to the 
right to pursue justice."). 
154 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 892 
(2013).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 
1128 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:3 
 
“dead against anything like an international court.”155  This 
skepticism has been attributed to a fear of compromising uniquely 
British political practices and institutions, and of any threat to 
parliamentary sovereignty.156  Even in the early 1950’s, many of the 
government’s concerns rested on preserving British policies 
towards political extremists.157  In an eerie echo of what the future 
would bring, Lord Chancellor Jowitt complained that “the 
Convention would prevent a future British government from 
detaining people without trial during a period of emergency.”158  
Indeed, to this day, British legislation continues to fiercely 
protect the preeminence of parliamentary sovereignty over the 
articles of the ECHR.  Only with the Human Rights Act of 1998 did 
the United Kingdom officially declare that it would be unlawful for 
any public body to act in a way incompatible with the Convention.  
Even then, an exception applies if a public body is following 
primary legislation issued by Parliament and the wording of the 
legislation cannot be construed in any way other than to contradict 
the ECHR.159  With this act, the United Kingdom also agreed to “take 
into account,” but not necessarily adhere to, any judgment from the 
European Court of Human Rights.160  
What did this mean for the victims of British government 
collusion and brutality during the Troubles?  Plagued with 
difficulties in having their cases heard, several families were 
selected to represent all those who wanted their stories heard and, 
more importantly, wanted the truth regarding the role the 
government played in their loved one’s deaths.  Two cases are 
examined here because they showcase international opinion, as well 
                                                     
155 Id. at 893 (citing Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: 
Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT. ORG. 217, 238 (2000)) (quoting W.E. 
Beckett, “legal advisor to the Foreign Office and the initiator of the British govern-
ment’s participation [in the drafting of the ECHR]”). 
156 Id.  
157 See generally id.  
158 Id. at 894. 
159 See Human Rights Act, (1998) § 3, available at http://www.legisla-
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents [perma.cc/U8VS-PJT4] (stating that the Act 
does not “affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompat-
ible primary legislation; and does not affect the validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement of any incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any pos-
sibility of revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of the incompatibil-
ity.”).  
160 Id. at § 2. 
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as demonstrate the level of “account” taken, in Britain, for the 
judgment of the ECtHR.   
3.2.1. The Case of Patrick Finucane 
The murder of human rights attorney Pat Finucane is one of the 
most well-known tragedies of the Troubles.  Finucane was shot and 
killed by two loyalist gunmen in front of his family during dinner at 
their home on the evening of February 12, 1989.161  Strong allegations 
of organized and institutionalized government collusion in the 
killing have circulated since that time.162  Finucane’s murder is 
unique in that the immediate circumstances of his death became 
relatively well-known (many victims’ families were not afforded 
such clarity), but Finucane’s family was not satisfied by mere 
knowledge of the circumstances of his death.  Even an apology from 
the Prime Minister himself has not placated them.  They continue to 
press for disclosure of government records and a full public inquiry, 
which they believe could reveal the purposeful and systematic 
targeting of victims by the government, as well as collusion with 
paramilitary forces to achieve the deaths of those victims.163  Such a 
revelation could serve an important role in establishing 
jurisprudence to prevent such government atrocities against its own 
people in the future.  
No evidence has ever surfaced that Finucane was a member of 
the IRA or any other Republican organization.  Rather, Finucane 
defended detainees alleged to be paramilitaries on both sides of the 
                                                     
161 See Q&A, The murder of Pat Finucane, BBC (June 26, 2015), available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-20683378 
[https://perma.cc/HRE5-52FN].  
162 Joaquin P. Terceno III, Burying the Truth: The Murder of Belfast Human Rights 
Lawyer Patrick Finucane and Britain’s “Secret” Public Inquires, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 6, 
3297, 3304 (2006) (noting that “What makes Finucane's assassination different-
though arguably not unique-is that, according to sixteen years of investigations, the 
British Army and the RUC police were complicit in his murder.”).  
163 See Q&A, The murder of Pat Finucane, BBC (June 26, 2015), available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-20683378 
[https://perma.cc/HRE5-52FN] (“The Finucane family have campaigned for a full 
public inquiry into the murder for many years and have repeatedly insisted that 
they will not accept anything less.  The Finucanes believe that a public inquiry, 
where the veracity of documents and witnesses can be tested under cross-examina-
tion, is the best way of getting to the truth about the extent of security force collu-
sion and exactly who knew what.”). 
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conflict,164 but it was his representation of alleged IRA members that 
likely prompted his targeting and killing.165  A mere five weeks prior 
to his death, Finucane received death threats delivered, via his 
clients, by officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.166  These 
included specific comments by police officers that Finucane would 
“meet his end” and was “getting took out.”167  Clients also reported 
that Finucane was abused and threatened by police officers 
generally when he came to visit them at holding centers to prepare 
for cases.168  Less than a month before Finucane’s death, Douglas 
Hogg MP, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, announced the government sentiment that “I 
have to state as a fact, but with great regret, that there are in 
Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are unduly 
sympathetic to the cause of the IRA.”169  This statement was later 
found to be unsubstantiated by fact.170  
Following his death, Finucane’s family was adamant that these 
claims and threats receive adequate investigation.  
Uncharacteristically, the Finucane case received a police 
investigation that was somewhat complete, when compared to other 
murders that occurred during the Troubles.  Certainly though, it 
was not nearly adequate by normal western standards.  The murder 
weapons, which had been previously reported as stolen from Ulster 
Defense Regiment’s barracks, were actually found.171  The Ulster 
                                                     
164 Finucane v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29178/95, 95 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 
(2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ search.aspx?i=001-
22606#{"itemid":["001-22606"]} [perma.cc/JEG2-ZWWM] (discussing the circum-
stances of the case, at subsection A of “The Facts”).   
165 Terceno, supra note 54, at 3303 (citing the Cory Report).  
166 Id.  
167 Id.  
168 Finucane v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29178/95, 95 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 
(2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ search.aspx?i=001-
22606#{"itemid":["001-22606"]} [perma.cc/JEG2-ZWWM] (“[C]lients reported that 
police officers often abused and threatened to kill [Finucane] during interrogations 
at holding centres . . . .”).  
169 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164.  
170 Joaquin P. Terceno III, Burying the Truth: The Murder of Belfast Human Rights 
Lawyer Patrick Finucane and Britain’s “Secret” Public Inquires, 74 FORDHAM LAW 
REVIEW, 3297, 3303 (2006) (noting that Hogg’s statements, based on information pro-
vided by the RUC, were determined unfounded by the Stevens enquiry). 
171 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 3, ¶¶ 15, 18; see also Terceno 
at 3304 (“One of the weapons used to gun down Finucane had been stolen from the 
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Freedom Fighter172 members in possession of the guns were 
convicted of possessing stolen property in April of 1990, but the 
police determined that those individuals had not been in possession 
of the guns at the time of the murder.173  The Finucane family was 
also granted an inquest to determine the cause of death, but it lasted 
one day and the family was not able to give a statement concerning 
the threats made against Finucane by the RUC, as this was deemed 
“not relevant to the proceedings.”174  
In the fall of 1989, the RUC assigned Deputy Chief Constable 
John Stevens to investigate allegations of collusion between 
government security forces and loyalist paramilitaries.175  His report 
revealed non-institutionalized, isolated incidents of collusion 
between Protestant paramilitary groups and the Ulster Defense 
Regiment,176 but no collusion within the RUC.177  Allegations of bias 
have since surfaced because the report was commissioned by the 
RUC and also resulted in extremely favorable findings for the police.  
Nonetheless, fifty-nine men were charged as a result of the report, 
                                                     
British Army Ulster Defense Regiment’s barracks by a quartermaster named Wil-
liam Stobie, who was both an agent for the RUC and a member of the paramilitary 
UDA.  Stobie was later charged with weapon theft and Finucane’s murder, but was 
shot dead by another paramilitary group before his trial concluded.”).  
172 The Ulster Defense Regiment was an illegal loyalist terrorist branch of the 
Ulster Defense Association.  
173 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 3, ¶ 15. 
174 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 3.  
175 Jason Rodrigues, Pat Finucane Timeline: From 1989 Murder to 2012 Report, 
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 1012), available at http://www.theguardian.com/ 
theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2012/dec/12/pat-finucane-timeline-murder-
report [https://perma.cc/4LNH-FDTJ] (In September of 1989, “Allegations that se-
curity forces colluded with loyalist groups to have republican targets killed prompt 
the government to send the then deputy chief constable of Cambridgeshire police, 
John Stevens, to Northern Ireland to investigate.  Stevens' appointment is the first 
of the three inquiries he is to run.”). 
176 Northern Ireland government armed forces. 
177 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 5, ¶ 23; CAIN Web Service, 
Collusion – Chronology of Events in the Stevens Inquiries, available at 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/chron.htm [https://perma.cc/Z9WU-
GXDV]  (“A summary of the report of the Stevens Inquiry was published (first in-
quiry).  The main finding of the report was that there had been evidence of collusion 
between members of the security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries.  However, it 
was the view of the inquiry that any collusion was "restricted to a small number of 
members of the security forces and is neither widespread nor institutionalized."). 
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including undercover agent Brian Nelson.178  Nelson worked as the 
Chief Intelligence Officer for the illegal loyalist paramilitary group 
known as the Ulster Defense Association while funneling 
information to the British government.  Nelson’s handlers, British 
officials who liaised with the undercover agents, claimed that 
Nelson had “gotten out of hand and had become personally 
involved in loyalist murder plots.”179  After this revelation the issue 
of whether Nelson had gone rogue within the organization or 
whether his activities were known to, and condoned by, his British 
handlers then became highly contested.180  After his conviction, 
Nelson manifested that he had independently chosen to target 
Finucane (rebutting allegations that his handlers had requested that 
Nelson suggest the hit), but that contrary to the government 
position, he had informed his handlers of the intended murder.181  
Presuming Nelson’s testimony was accurate, however, then 
Finucane was inexplicably neither warned by British intelligence of 
any such threat nor protected by the police, despite that they had 
allegedly been made aware of the hit by Nelson.182  
Nelson’s confession to his involvement in Finucane’s murder 
was passed to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and an 
additional inquiry into the situation was ordered.183  Once 
completed, the findings of the inquiry were sensitive enough to be 
earmarked as confidential,184 but the DPP suggested that the inquiry 
lacked sufficient evidence and declined to prosecute Nelson or any 
other suspects.185  In relation to civil proceedings that alleged her 
husband’s murder was committed by or with the connivance, 
knowledge or encouragement of the Ministry of Defence and Brian 
Nelson, Finucane’s widow, Geraldine, requested the opportunity to 
                                                     
178 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 5, ¶ 23, 24. 
179 Id.  
180 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 5, ¶ 24-28 (Not only was 
Nelson tried, but while in prison he confessed to involvement in the crime in a BBC 
Panorama programme, which was then sent to the Chief Constable of the RUC for 
further inquiries.  However, in 1995 the DPP concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence to warrant prosecution.). 
181 Id.  
182 Id.  Knowledge of, and failure to warn, the Finucane family of the intended 
hit on Pat Finucane became one of the central claims in the Finucane case against 
the government.  
183 Id. at ¶ 26. 
184 Id. at ¶ 28. 
185 Id.  
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view originals of the documents.186  In 1999, the Ministry responded, 
claiming it was no longer in possession of the documents.187  
Shockingly, a taped confession of gunman Ken Barratt was also 
“lost.”188  At this time, Geraldine Finucane petitioned the European 
Court of Human Rights to hear the case.  
Meanwhile, the government ordered a third inquiry.  Later that 
year, criminal charges were brought against William Alfred Stobie, 
a paid police informer, for the murder of Pat Finucane.189   Stobie 
testified that  “he gave the police information on two occasions 
before the Finucane murder which was not acted upon” and that for 
the past ten years police had been in possession of information that 
could have convicted Stobie for other paramilitary offenses, but they 
declined to do so.190  Two years after the charges were brought, the 
case against Stobie fell apart when the central witness refused to 
testify.  Shortly after his release, Stobie was gunned down by loyalist 
paramilitaries.191  
In February of 2002, the ECtHR agreed to hear the Finucane case.  
After hearing the evidence, the Court determined that Article Two 
of the European Convention of Human Rights was indeed 
implicated in the facts of the case.  Article Two provides that: 
1.  Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.  No one 
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the 
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of 
a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
2.  Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in 
contravention of this Article when it results from the use of 
force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
(a)  in defence [sic] of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b)  in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the 
                                                     
186 Id. at ¶ 31. 
187 Id. 
188 Yasmine Ahmed, BIRW Response to Stevens 3, British Irish Rights Watch 
(June 19, 2015) available at http://rwuk.org/inquiries/birw-response-to-stevens-3/ 
[https://perma.cc/AGC2-BYUX]. 
189 Finucane v. United Kingdom, supra note 164, at 3, ¶ 16. 
190 Id. at 8, ¶ 36.  
191 Id. at ¶ 38.  
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escape of a person lawfully detained; 
(c)  in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a 
riot or insurrection.”192 
In relevant part, procedural interpretation of Article Two 
requires that a full investigation take place to determine whether a 
victim has been impermissibly deprived of life within the provisions 
of the Convention.  ECtHR case law specifically requires that, in 
order to qualify as an appropriate investigation, 
[T] he state's response to lethal force deaths caused by state 
actors must be (1) prompt; (2) independent, meaning that the 
investigators must be institutionally and hierarchically 
separate from the state institution (e.g. the military or police) 
accused of causing the death; (3) effective, in the sense of 
producing evidence that can lead to prosecutions of 
responsible individuals where this is warranted; and (4) 
transparent, both to the public at large as well as to the 
family members of the victim.193 
In July of 2003, the Court came down with the opinion that the 
circumstances of Finucane’s death and subsequent investigation 
warranted the application of Article Two provisions, and finally 
determined that indeed, a violation of the Convention had 
occurred.194  Because the police investigation of the murder had been 
conducted by the same officers that were suspected of making death 
threats to Finucane, this constituted an impermissible lack of 
independence under Article Two.  Also, because these threats and 
the allegations of collusion were never examined at all, the 
investigation was not effective under the meaning of Article Two.195  
In the eyes of the Court, the fact that the investigation was still 
ongoing ten years after the murder violated the requirement of 
promptness in the eyes of the Court.  Finally, because no 
                                                     
192 European Convention on Human Rights, Article Two Section I (Rights and 
Freedoms) 6, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ 
Convention_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/US7V-73GS] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).   
193 Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8, at 423.  
194 Finucane v. the United Kingdom – Summary, NETHERLANDS INST. OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, UTRECHT SCHOOL OF LAW, available at http://sim.law.uu.nl/sim/ 
caselaw/Hof.nsf/2422ec00f1ace923c1256681002b47f1/ 
93b44b6e80ca191841256d58002eaf1f?OpenDocument [perma.cc/JEG2-ZWWM].  
195 Id.  
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documentation had been made public to either the community at 
large or the family, the investigation lacked the necessary 
transparency that the Convention demanded.  Thus, on all four 
procedural requirements the government failed to uphold its 
human rights obligations under the Convention.  The court 
recommended an independent public inquiry to determine the truth 
of the allegations.  
At the time that the ECtHR was considering Finucane’s case, the 
Good Friday Agreement was also nearing completion.  Part of the 
agreement stipulated that an independent international judge 
would consider six cases alleging government collusion to 
determine if additional public inquiries were necessary.  Finucane’s 
case was among those chosen for consideration, and many hoped 
that this would result in the public investigation that both the Court 
and the family demanded.  Perhaps surprisingly, in accordance with 
the Good Friday Agreement, the independent international judge 
completed his investigation and published a report of his findings.  
Judge Cory’s report indeed found that four of the six cases had 
strong implications of collusion, and recommended that the public 
inquiries take place.196  
In 2004, the government agreed to conduct the inquires, but 
subsequently passed the Inquires Act in 2005, shifting control over 
public inquiries from the legislative to the executive branch.197  The 
government stated that evidence compromising national security 
interests made cases like Pat Finucane’s the exclusive domain of the 
executive, and then declined to pursue the inquiry.  The Finucane 
family has pointed to the indication that Finucane’s case would 
implicate national security interests as evidence suggesting that the 
government was indeed involved in the murder, and that it was an 
official act and not a result of Nelson acting as a rogue agent.198  
Indeed, it is hard to see why a murder that was unplanned by, and 
unbeknownst to state actors could implicate sensitive national 
security information.  Additionally, international human rights 
groups expressed outrage at the passage of the Inquiries Act, 
declaring that it further violated the United Kingdom’s obligations 
                                                     
196 Terceno, supra note 59, at 3301. 
197 Id.   
198 Interview with John Finucane, Solicitor and son of Pat Finucane, Belfast, 
Northern Ireland (June 2013).  
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under the ECHR because the Act allows the government to withhold 
information on state involvement in a murder.199  
In 2011, the government ordered a paper-based review of 
Finucane’s death.  The investigation was handled by Sir Desmond 
De Silva, and resulted in a report hundreds of pages in length that 
ultimately implicated the government in “shocking collusion” with 
Protestant paramilitaries that resulted in Finucane’s death.  The De 
Silva Report acknowledged: 
[A] number of ways in which the State and its agents 
colluded in the Finucane killing, including: leaking 
information to loyalist paramilitaries, amongst them the 
UDA; failing to act on information that Finucane was under 
threat of attack by loyalist paramilitaries; playing “key roles” 
in the actual killing, including by facilitating access to the 
murder weapon; refusing to investigate, arrest and 
prosecute UDA operatives at the time, despite evidence of 
their criminality; and covering up collusion in the killing for 
over two decades.200  
Undoubtedly, British officials hoped that the report, coupled 
with a public apology by the Prime Minister David Cameron, would 
placate the family and settle the Finucane case for good, thereby 
avoiding actual litigation on the issue.201  However, the documents 
that form the basis of the De Silva report have not been released, 
                                                     
199 Terceno, supra note 59, at 3301. 
200 Northern Ireland: 25 Years After Finucane Killing, Failure to Hold Inquiry Not 
Only Cruel, But Positively Sinister, AMNESTY INT’L UK PRESS RELEASES (Feb. 12, 2014, 
10:45 AM), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/northern-ireland-25-
years-after-finucane-killing-failure-hold-inquiry-not-only-cruel [perma.cc/FGQ4-
Q7UN]. 
201 Brian Rowan, Pat Finucane Killing: Why Murder of Lawyer is a Death That 
Never Went Away, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.belfasttele-
graph.co.uk/debateni/blogs/brian-rowan/pat-finucane-killing-why-murder-of-
lawyer-is-a-death-that-never-went-away-29994732.html [perma.cc/6LBN-BCRF]. 
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even to the family,202 despite promises to publicize them203 as well 
as other reports concerning the views of other prominent ministers 
drafted at the time of the violence.  The family thus remains 
unsatisfied.204 
At the twenty-five year anniversary of Finucane’s death, Rights 
Watch UK publicly wrote to Whitehall to remind the Prime Minister 
of his promise to publish the reports.205  They have not received a 
response.206  Perhaps more importantly, the Finucane family now 
demands a full public inquiry not only for the sake of determining 
exactly how and why the government interacted with loyalist 
paramilitaries in their father’s killing, but to determine the extent of 
government involvement in the violence of the Troubles overall.207  
Currently, the government has expressed no intention of adhering 
to the demands of the ECtHR opinion that it complete its 
                                                     
202 British Irish Rights Watch, Pat Finucane: The Fight for Justice, ¶ 24, available 
at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1& 
ved=0ahUKEwjKzOOB_ujLAhWJ8x4KHbCyCXgQFggf-
MAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gov.uk%2Fgovernment%2Fuploads%2Fsys-
tem%2Fuploads%2Fattach-
ment_data%2Ffile%2F246867%2F0802.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFlq56Si_rr9x1XYmjV2M
Rq39KC6g [https://perma.cc/E63K-2XFW] (explaining that “Not only would the 
Finucane family be denied sight of many crucial documents, but they would not 
even know which documents they were being denied.”). 
203 Finucane Lawyer to Publish Classified Reports, RTE NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), 
available at http://www.rte.ie/news/2011/1110/308531-finucanep/ 
[https://perma.cc/X6EM-HAQQ] (“The lawyer appointed by the British govern-
ment to carry out a review of the murder of Belfast solicitor Pat Finucane and the 
collusion of the British security services in the killing, has said he intends to declas-
sify and publish original intelligence documents alongside his report.”). 
204 British Irish Rights Watch, Pat Finucane: The Fight for Justice, supra note 
202(noting that when the government explained the plan for the de Silva report, 
“[t]his process fell so far short of the family’s most basic requirements that Gerald-
ine Finucane brought the meeting to an end after just 30 minutes.”); see also British 
Irish Rights Watch, press release, “27 years since the murder of Patrick Finucane: 
still no justice” available at http://rwuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/      Fi-
nucane-27-PR.pdf.  
205 Broken Promises and Opportunities Lost – The Finucane Case – An Update, 
RIGHTS WATCH (UK) (Jan. 11, 2014, 12:49PM), http://www.rwuk.org/all/ finucanc-
case-update/ [https://perma.cc/9CVJ-VHJ8] (“The failure of the Prime Minister to 
expeditiously publish the views of his Ministers regarding the murder of Patrick 
Finucane and role of the British state in his death only serve to heighten the suspi-
cion surrounding this case and that the de Silva review has raised more questions 
than it has provided answers.”). 
206 Id.  
207 Northern Ireland: 25 Years After Finucane Killing, supra note 200. 
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investigatory obligations under the ECHR, and has not responded 
to the requests of the Finucane family.  
3.2.2. The Case of Pearse Jordan 
On November 25, 1992, Pearse Jordan was shot and killed by a 
member of the RUC, identified in legal documentation as Sergeant 
A.208  According to eyewitnesses, Jordan, who was known to be a 
volunteer member of the IRA, was driving a car that was rammed 
by police officers.209  He was unarmed, got out of the car and 
attempted to flee on foot when he was shot three times in the back.  
In contrast with the unofficial reports circulated to the media, the 
car contained no explosives, masks, guns, or other paramilitary 
paraphernalia.210  Jordan died a short time after the shooting, and 
the case has become known as one implicating the shoot-to-kill 
policies of the police Special Support Unit, or SSU.211  The SSU had 
been involved in six similar shootings previously.212  The shootings 
sparked outrage when evidence showed that all six victims were 
unarmed and all of the SSU task members involved, including 
Sergeant A, had made false statements to cover up the truth of the 
incidents.213  
In May of 1993, the RUC completed an investigation into the 
shooting and submitted its findings to the DPP.214  The family was 
notified that the investigation was complete, and that it was deemed 
“satisfactory,” but was not actually informed of any findings.215  This 
                                                     
208 Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(April 8, 2011) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ 
search.aspx?i=001-59450#{"itemid":["001-59450"]} [perma.cc/B6L6-TFJJ].  
209 Id.  
210 Id.  
211 Barry McCaffrey, RUC Man Who Shot Unarmed PIRA Man Told Doctor Job 
Had Been ‘Great Until Ceasefire,’ THE DETAIL (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.thede-
tail.tv/issues/135/pearse-jordan-shoot-to-kill-inquest/ruc-man-who-shot-un-
armed-pira-man-told-doctor-job-had-been-great-until-ceasefire [perma.cc/PH8W-
UDBM].  
212 Id.  
213 Id. (In 1995, Sergeant A complained to an RUC doctor that his job had been 
“great, until the ceasefire,” intimating that the absence of armed conflict in North-
ern Ireland rendered his job boring).  
214 Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(April 8, 2011) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ 
search.aspx?i=001-59450#{"itemid":["001-59450"]} [perma.cc/B6L6-TFJJ].  
215 Id.  
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was a far more typical conclusion to investigatory findings for most 
of the families of victims of Troubles aggression, as compared to the 
modicum of information that the Finucane family received.  In 
November of the same year, the DPP notified the RUC that the 
evidence from the investigation was insufficient to warrant 
prosecution of any individual.  The RUC in turn notified the 
Coroner’s office of the finding, and the Coroner decided to hold an 
inquest.216  Approximately one year later, the Coroner received the 
investigation report from the police, and notified the family that the 
inquest was scheduled to begin in January of 1995.217  Prior to the 
inquest, the Secretary of State for Defense suggested, and the 
Coroner agreed, that certain sensitive information would be 
withheld from the proceeding for national security reasons, and that 
the identities of the officers involved would be kept confidential.  
Later, additional information was withheld for fear of 
“compromising the integrity of RUC operations.”218  Presumably 
then, these operations were still ongoing.  
Over the course of the inquest, as new evidence emerged, the 
family repeatedly requested that the DPP reconsider its decision not 
to prosecute, and in the alternative suggested that the coroner was 
not conducting the inquest fairly.  These requests delayed the 
inquest, which was eventually concluded in 2000, five years later, 
without resolution.  Requests for judicial review (a process 
equivalent to an appeal in the United States), as well as 
complications with requests for legal aid, financial assistance for the 
family, and suggestions that vital police investigation information 
was being withheld from the family and their attorney were also 
handled with impermissible slowness, further delaying the process.  
Due to the hindrance, the ECtHR eventually agreed to hear the case.  
After merely one year, on May 4, 2001, the ECtHR concluded 
that international law applied to the facts of the case, including the 
United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by 
Law Enforcement Officials, which provides that the “intentional 
lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable 
                                                     
216 An inquest is an extremely limited investigation, designed only to deter-
mine who the deceased was, and how, when and where the deceased’s death came 
about.  Generally, an inquest is not meant to apportion criminal liability to the cause 
of death.  Id. at ¶44.  
217 Id.  
218 Id. at ¶ 33.  
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in order to protect life.”219  The ECHR was also implicated, including 
specifically Article Two, cited above.220  
The court held that no factual findings could be made because 
the fact-finding portion of the investigation had not yet been 
completed to the Court’s satisfaction (despite the “satisfactory” 
investigation that the police assured the family had been 
completed).221  The Court instead found that the investigations were 
carried out by the police force with an impermissible absence of 
independence.222  The victim’s family was also inadequately 
informed of the proceedings, and an overall lack of public scrutiny 
permeated the process.223  The fact that the officer who shot Jordan 
could not be compelled to attend the inquest as a witness was also a 
serious shortcoming.  Finally, “the absence of legal aid for the 
representation of the victim’s family and non-disclosure of witness 
statements prior to their appearance at the inquest prejudiced the 
ability of the applicant to participate in the inquest and contributed 
to long adjournments in the proceedings.”224 
The Court further considered whether the procedural aspects of 
Article Two had been complied with, and found violations there as 
well.225  Generally, the procedural aspects of Article Two require a 
prompt, transparent, independent and thorough investigation 
whenever a state has been implicated in the death of a citizen.226  
Regarding the delays causing the inquest to last over five years, the 
Court concluded that “the time taken in this inquest cannot be 
regarded as compatible with the State’s obligation under Article 
Two of the Convention to ensure that investigations into suspicious 
                                                     
219 G.A. Res. 45/166, United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, ¶ 9 (1990). 
220 See supra pp. 35-36. 
221 Jordan v. United Kingdom, ¶ 23, App. No. 24746/94, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 
8, 2011) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ 
search.aspx?i=001-59450#{"itemid":["001-59450"]} [perma.cc/B6L6-TFJI] (reciting 
the ICPC’s claim that “the criminal investigation into the shooting was satisfac-
tory”). 
222 Id. at ¶ 142. 
223 Id.  
224 Id.   
225 Id. at ¶ 115 (stating that the investigation may not merely lead to the award-
ing of damages, but “must be able to lead to the identification and punishment of 
those responsible”). 
226 Id. at ¶ 105-08.  
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deaths are carried out promptly and with reasonable expedition.”227 
The Court concluded by admonishing the state for practices that run 
counter to the professed goals of the domestic courts of “allaying 
suspicions and rumours” and warned that “[l]ack of such 
procedures will only add fuel to fears of sinister motivations, as is 
illustrated inter alia by the submissions made by the applicant 
concerning the alleged shoot-to-kill policy.”228  
Following the European Court’s judgment, the Coroner 
scheduled the Inquest to resume in June of 2001, but the start was 
delayed and did not in fact begin until February of 2002.  The family 
challenged the decision to delay, but their objection was denied.  
Various additional challenges and delays concerning the 
proceedings ensued,229 until eventually the Coroner agreed to recuse 
himself in 2009.230  The proceedings again began in 2010, and 
resulted in a hopelessly divided jury verdict in the fall of 2012.231  
Undeterred, the diligent family motioned to quash the jury verdict, 
                                                     
227 Id. at ¶ 140.  
228 Id. at ¶ 144.  
229 These delays included a successful challenge to the Coroner’s decision to 
ignore the ECtHR judgment and proceed on the basis of “existing Coroner’s law 
and practice,” which was not resolved until 2004.  Coroner Forced to Stand Down from 
Pearse Jordan Inquest, ANPHOBLACHT (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.anpho-
blacht.com/contents/20762 [https://perma.cc/9B8Q-Q3UL].  The issue of the 
compellability of Sergeant A was also revisited, and again challenged by the family, 
until finally in 2012 the Sergeant, who was by then living out of the country, agreed 
of his own volition to come forward (the Court was still unable to compel his testi-
mony as he was beyond the jurisdiction of British courts).  Id.; See also Barry McCaf-
frey, RUC Man Who Shot Unarmed PIRA Man Told Doctor Job Had Been ‘Great Until 
Ceasefire,’ THE DETAIL (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.thedetail.tv/issues/135/pearse-
jordan-shoot-to-kill-inquest/ruc-man-who-shot-unarmed-pira-man-told-doctor-
job-had-been-great-until-ceasefire [perma.cc/PH8W-UDBM].  
230 Coroner Forced to Stand Down from Pearse Jordan Inquest, ANPHOBLACHT (Oct. 
15, 2009), http://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/20762 
[https://perma.cc/9B8Q-Q3UL]..  
231 RUC Man Who Shot Unarmed Pearse Jordan in the Back Fails in Bid to be 
Screened from Pearse’s Parents, MADDEN & FINUCANE, SOLICITORS (Feb. 20, 2016), 
available at http://madden-finucane.com/2016/02/20/ruc-man-who-shot-un-
armed-pearse-jordan-in-the-back-fails-in-bid-to-be-screened-from-pearses-par-
ents/ [https://perma.cc/GU28-W27R] (detailing the “hopelessly divided” jury); 
see also Pearse Jordan Inquest Findings Quashed in IRA Death Case, BBC NEWS 
NORTHERN IRELAND (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ire-
land-25981320 [perma.cc/6BJE-Q8Y5] (noting that “the jury was split on whether 
reasonable force was used, the state of belief on the part of the officer who fired the 
fatal shots, and whether any alternative course of action was open to him.”).  
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and requested a new inquest.232  In a landmark 129 page opinion that 
came down in January of 2014, the High Court in Belfast ruled that 
the inquest findings would indeed be quashed, and found the PSNI 
at fault for the eleven years of delays and failing to provide 
requested documentation.233  Though the Coroner and Chief 
Constable have appealed this decision,234 it nonetheless gives 
renewed hope that perhaps a third inquest more than a decade later, 
will result in justice and resolution for the Jordan family.235 
4.  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 
MEASURES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The judgments discussed above are meant to demonstrate not 
just the lack of domestic resolution for Troubles-related cases, but 
also the lack of enforcement for judgments of the ECtHR regarding 
British investigation of counter-terrorism activities during the 
Troubles.  They also suggest a potentially gaping hole for future 
enforcement of international restrictions on counter-terrorism 
activities.  Finally, the cases demonstrate the lengths to which the 
government will go to avoid investigating these past events, in 
which, until very recently, they claimed no institutional 
involvement.  Despite the dogged attempts of victims’ families and 
the edicts of international bodies to the contrary, the state has 
steadfastly refused to meaningfully investigate these historical 
cases.  In the past, the State has cited the cost of a public inquiry as 
its primary reason for refusal.236  However, the importance of the 
                                                     
232 Pearse Jordan Inquest Findings Quashed in IRA Death Case, BBC NEWS 
NORTHERN IRELAND (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ire-
land-25981320 [perma.cc/6BJE-Q8Y5]. 
233 Pearse Jordan Inquest Findings Quashed in IRA Death Case, BBC NEWS 
NORTHERN IRELAND (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ire-
land-25981320 [perma.cc/6BJE-Q8Y5].  
234 Pearse Jordan Inquest Verdict Appealed by Coroner and Chief Constable, BBC 
NEWS NORTHERN IRELAND (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-north-
ern-ireland-26561105 [perma.cc/2GEJ-CTRU] (noting that “Lawyers for both the 
coroner and chief constable are preparing challenges to the verdict.”). 
235 Pearse Jordan Inquest Findings Quashed in IRA Death Case, BBC NEWS 
NORTHERN IRELAND (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ire-
land-25981320 [perma.cc/6BJE-Q8Y5].  
236 Brian Rowan, Pat Finucane Killing: Why Murder of Lawyer is a Death That 
Never Went Away, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.belfasttele-
graph.co.uk/debateni/blogs/brian-rowan/pat-finucane-killing-why-murder-of-
lawyer-is-a-death-that-never-went-away-29994732.html [perma.cc/6LBN-BCRF]. 
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issue and the degree of tenacity the state has expressed may suggest 
that some underlying state motivation beyond concerns about cost.  
Recent isolated admissions of, and apologies for, the supposedly 
limited past government involvement in Troubles related violence, 
after years of denial hints at greater institution-wide policies of 
involvement hidden in the confidential documents that families, 
such as the Jordans and the Finucanes seek to disclose in ongoing 
litigation.  
More importantly, for the purposes of this paper, the fact that 
disclosures of confidential documents pose a current national 
security risk suggests that the information they hide still has 
applicability to current counter terrorism measures.  That the British 
government engaged in isolated unlawful counter-terrorism acts 
during the Troubles is undisputed.  The Bloody Sunday Massacre in 
Londonderry on January 30, 1972, is probably the most famous of 
these.237  There, Northern Irish protesters were marching in protest 
of British government policies of interning suspected Irish 
nationalists.238  The march had been banned, so British soldiers were 
sent to disband them.239  They fired indiscriminately into the crowd, 
killing thirteen and wounding an additional seventeen people.240  A 
report in 1972 exonerated the British troops involved in the killing,241 
and indeed it was later discovered that some of the protesters were 
armed.242  However, the report was so fraught with error and “white 
wash[ing]” that local citizens were outraged and even the British 
government quickly distanced itself from the findings.243  For years, 
                                                     
237 Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history. 
com/this-day-in-history/bloody-sunday-in-northern-ireland [perma.cc/NWP4-
NP9E] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
238 Id.  
239 Id.  
240 Id.  
241 Id.  
242 Saville Inquiry into Bloody Sunday, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/his-
tory/events/saville_inquiry_into_bloody_Sunday [perma.cc/NWP4-NP9E] (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2016) (describing testimony of Martin McGuinness, who was found 
to be carrying a “Thompson sub-machine gun” at the protest during the day in 
question.  The previous allegations that McGuinness had fired the first shot were 
dismissed as there was insufficient evidence to support this conclusion.).   
243 The following year, a Coroner called the shooting “sheer, unadulterated 
murder” and in 1974 the government made “goodwill” payments to the families, 
though they failed to admit to any responsibility in the deaths.  Id.   
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 
1144 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:3 
 
individuals in both the private sector and the government expressed 
a need for another investigation.244  International pressure also 
mounted,245 but none was forthcoming until 1998, when Prime 
Minister Tony Blair announced a judicial inquiry, headed by Lord 
Saville of Newdigate.246  Its findings were released in 2010.  As an 
initial matter, it was concluded that none of the victims posed a 
threat of causing death or serious injury to the soldiers or each 
other.247  The soldiers of the paratrooper unit were indeed 
determined to be at fault for their deaths.248  In a similar style to the 
Finucane admission, British Prime Minister David Cameron later 
made a statement that the deaths of the Bloody Sunday Massacre at 
the hands of British soldiers were both “unjustified” and 
“unjustifiable.”249  It is this massacre that can be perceived most 
easily as a blatant violation of human rights on the part of the British 
government while it engaged in counter-terrorism during the 
Troubles.250  
It is becoming clear that many of the measures they employed 
on a systematic basis were also illegal in terms of international 
human rights law.  However, recent implicit acknowledgement that 
the counter-terrorism strategies used during the Troubles are still 
relevant to, or informative of, the measures in use today, would 
suggest that the current clandestine measures remain illegal as 
well.251  This deduction would neatly explain the formidable efforts 
                                                     
244 Id.  
245 Bloody Sunday and the Report of the Widgery Tribunal, CAIN (June 1997), 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/bsunday/irgovt.htm [perma.cc/UGB8-4847]. 
246 It was this inquiry to which British government officials pointed when they 
stressed the expense of such investigations as a reason for why others of a similar 
ilk should not ensue.  Id.  
247 “Lord Saville concluded that firing by soldiers of 1 Para on Bloody Sunday 
caused the deaths of 13 people and injury to a similar number, none of whom was 
posing a threat of causing death or serious injury.  What happened on Bloody Sun-
day strengthened the Provisional IRA, increased nationalist resentment and hostil-
ity towards the Army and exacerbated the violent conflict of the years that fol-
lowed.  Bloody Sunday was a tragedy for the bereaved and the wounded, and a 
catastrophe for the people of Northern Ireland."  Id. 
248 Id.  
249 Id.  
250 See generally, British Rights Watch Report, http://rwuk.org/bloody-sun-
day-inquiry/ [perma.cc/2QZQ-UTWN] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (similarly skep-
tical of the British government’s justifications for bloody Sunday massacre).  
251 See generally, supra p. 54.  
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government officials have made to avoid any investigations of, or 
rulings on, past actions. 
The fortuitousness of the timing of the ECtHR judgments and 
the September 11, 2001 attacks is notable.  The terrorist attacks on 
September 11th constituted a turning point for international law and 
terrorism.  Though there had been atrocities in the past that had 
spurred a demand for new anti-terrorism legislation,252 this was by 
far the most compelling incident to date.  Almost immediately, the 
United Nations recognized “an inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence…”253  A Counter-Terrorism Committee was 
established to enforce the binding U.N. resolution that all states act 
to take financial, penal and other regulatory measures against 
terrorism.  
However, as with most abrupt changes in legal landscape, 
questions soon arose.254  Unlike during the Troubles, when British 
actions were intra-national and thus flew predominantly under the 
international radar, the new international climate highlighting 
terrorism has placed more attention upon counter-terrorism 
activities and their legality.255  In response, “[i]n 2004 . . . the Council 
adopted resolutions ‘[r]eminding States that they must ensure that 
any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their 
obligations under international law . . .”256  Amnesty International 
issued warnings that defining terrorism too broadly would easily 
bring State security concerns into conflict with individual human 
rights.257  The European Court of Justice has expressed its opinion 
lamenting the failure of the Security Council to develop an 
independent and impartial body responsible for hearing and 
determining the legality of various actions against individuals 
                                                     
252 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 384-85 
(2013) (referencing Russian push for anti-terrorist legislation after an attack on a 
school, by “[a] Chechnyan armed group”, resulted in the deaths of 300 civilians, 
many of them children).  
253 Id. at 388; see also S.C. Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
254 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 388-892 
(2013) (noting that “[t]he attacks on 11 September 2001” were pivotal “in the rela-
tionships between international law, global institutions, and terrorism”).  
255 Id. at 388-90 (discussing the Security Council’s establishment of the Coun-
ter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) “to monitor the implementation” of anti-terrorist 
resolutions).   
256 Id. at 389 (citing S.C. Res. 1535 (2004)). 
257 Id. at 387-88.  
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accused of terrorism.  As suddenly as it arrived, the massive tidal 
wave of anti-terrorist legislation that could well have dissolved 
every Troubles-victims’ claim against Great Britain, appears to be 
taking an about face.  International organizations are cautiously 
back-pedaling.  As a result, new attention to restriction upon anti-
terrorism measures means that historical atrocities that could well 
have been swept under the rug for an eternity have taken on new 
meaning.  The victims of British brutality during the Troubles 
cannot go back in time to protect their rights and stop the deaths that 
government acts likely caused.  However, litigating historical cases 
may act as a springboard for the enforcement of rights for those 
affected, as collateral damage, in an attempt to combat today’s 
terrorist actors. 
So, what exactly are the United Kingdom’s legal obligations 
when they act in the name of counter-terrorism?  Some argue that 
human rights conventions and charters should apply generally in 
these circumstances.258  Dieter Fleck suggests that “[t]o the extent 
that certain aspects of internal disturbances and tensions may not be 
covered by international humanitarian law, individuals remain 
under the protection of international law guaranteeing fundamental 
human rights.”  A blanket application of human rights obligations 
would also circumvent the problem in determining whether an 
armed conflict is ongoing or not.  Certainly, the United Kingdom has 
signed a great many human rights treaties that include broad 
commitments to honor the rights of individuals.  Like the United 
States, however, the United Kingdom has been known to employ a 
host of reservations when signing a treaty.  Even when signed, the 
treaties are not self-executing and often carry little weight within the 
greater scheme of parliamentary law, which remains sovereign.  To 
attain force, Parliament must ratify the treaties and often enact 
complimentary legislation holding that they are enforceable within 
the State, as was done with the 1998 Human Rights Act, making the 
ECHR a more dominant force in domestic law. However, even when 
ratified, compliance is not assured.  For example, in 2007 Parliament 
instituted a “control order regime” of new counter-terrorism 
                                                     
258 Id. at 1500 (“[I]t is a small step to suggest that such international human 
rights obligations apply at all times to all armed opposition groups.”).  
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legislation.259  “The high court, the court of appeal and parliament's 
joint human rights committee have all said that a significant number 
of the 17 control orders in force are being routinely exercised in 
breach of the right to liberty under article five” of the ECHR.260  
However, because courts may only issue a declaration of 
noncompliance to weaken, but not overturn parliamentary law, 
there is little that can truly be done to force the government to 
conform to the international treaty.  
Meanwhile, at the time of the Troubles, and to this day,  
[v]arious international treaties protecting the right of 
contracting states to introduce emergency legislation; 
confusion in the international arena, and particularly in 
international law, over how to handle terrorist violence; and 
the mistaken application of a “hierarchy of rights” both 
inside the United Kingdom and abroad contribute to the use 
of liberalism to justify emergency law.261   
And, as we have already seen, once emergency law is instituted 
and States begin to act against terrorists, there is comparatively little 
that international bodies and domestic citizens alike can do to force 
States to rescind the legislation.262  In her paper entitled “Civil 
Liberties, Terrorism and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from the 
United Kingdom,” Donahue adds the observation that, “[i]n 
addition there also existed a tendency within the security forces to 
support the extension of such measures as part of their arsenal in the 
fight against terrorism.  Once the powers had been gained, those 
wielding them were unwilling to see them diminished.”263 
The European regional human rights system, and within it the 
ECtHR, is the most effective human rights instrument in the world, 
                                                     
259 Alan Travis & Vikram Dodd, Reid Warning to Judges Over Control Orders, 
THE GUARDIAN (May 24, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/ 
may/25/uk.topstories3 [perma.cc/9G67-53KY] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016). 
260 Id. (noting that “home secretary, John Reid, made clear yesterday he is pre-
pared to declare a ‘state of emergency’ to suspend key parts of the human rights 
convention if the law lords do not overturn a series of judgments that have weak-
ened the anti-terrorist control order regime.”).  
261 Donahue, supra note 40, p. 2. 
262 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying Diplock courts discussion.   
263 Donahue, supra note 40, at 8. 
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in terms of commanding compliance with its judgments.264  Yet the 
United Kingdom has successfully eluded even the semblance of 
compliance with their requests regarding investigations into the 
Troubles and the historical cases.  Important now is the movement 
that internationally, actors are starting to take note of the lengths 
that States will go to counter terrorism.265  Their attention to this 
issue has reached a level that would have been unprecedented 
before September 11th.  In recent years, international human rights 
groups and other actors have played a game of catch-up to declare 
dissatisfaction with counter-terrorist measures, including those 
employed by the British Government during the Troubles.  The 
British government undoubtedly violated a number of international 
agreements prohibiting arbitrary arrests, internment, torture and 
killings.266  However, prior to September 11th, perceptions in 
Westminster abounded that its counter-terrorism measures “were 
both necessary and acceptable outside of Great Britain, and the 
symbolic importance of “antiterrorist” measures provided a direct 
impetus for the . . . continued operation.”267 
The pro-state security measures following September 11th, and 
the more recent backlash to what was seen as an overreach by States, 
has likely made many in the United Kingdom aware that its 
measures are viewed as neither necessary nor acceptable.  Indeed, 
international reprimands now circulate, including Amnesty 
International’s report, “Northern Ireland: Time to Deal With the 
Past,” which criticize Great Britain, not only for presently 
obstructing human rights by failing to provide adequate judicial 
mechanisms so that victims of the Troubles can confront the 
paramilitary groups, but also condemn the failure to atone for its 
grievous past behavior.268  Relating more specifically to anti-
                                                     
264 Matiangai Sirleaf, Course Lecture about International Human Rights at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School (Mar. 18, 2014) (explaining that, as com-
pared to other human rights bodies, the European system is the most advance in 
terms of its capabilities to hear and decide complaints, and those decisions receive 
the highest rate of compliance).  
265 Donahue’s paper is one such example.  
266 See supra notes 164-177 and accompanying discussion of counter-terrorist 
measures, such as the Bloody Sunday Massacre. 
267 Donahue, supra note 40, at 6. 
268 See generally Amnesty International, Northern Ireland: Time to Deal with 
the Past (2013), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/time_to_ 
deal_with_the_past_0.pdf [perma.cc/N2MY-6UHH] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).  
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terrorism measures, in 2002 the Inter-American Commission on 
human rights declared that “most fundamental fair trial 
requirements cannot justifiably be suspended under either 
international human rights law or international humanitarian law . 
. . . including those related to terrorism, regardless of whether such 
initiatives may be taken in time of peace or times of national 
emergency, including armed conflict . . . .”269  Other international 
bodies have made similar declarations.  The arbitrary detentions, 
arrests and the Diplock Courts in the United Kingdom failed these 
standards and violated the international limitations on acceptable 
counter-terrorism measures. 
5.  IMPACTS OF LITIGATING THE TROUBLES’ CLAIMS 
The often forgotten fact that the Troubles were in their heyday a 
mere thirty years ago, combined with the eerie similarities to some 
of the tactics reportedly in use against Islamic and other terrorists 
today, suggests that strong attention to Troubles litigation could 
impact current anti-terrorist activities.  
Justifications for current anti-terrorist measures and those used 
during the Troubles are similar.  Three examples of rhetoric used by 
British politicians in particular resonate with arguments routinely 
used at present to justify counter-terrorism legislation that also 
infringes on protected human rights.  First, the British Parliament 
had long held the view that “Northern Ireland bears a unique 
history within which special powers are acceptable, or even 
necessary.”270  Thus, using special powers to handle the situation in 
Northern Ireland was justified, while parliament members readily 
admitted that no one in England would ever be forced to suffer such 
a radical approach.  The people and the scenarios were too different.  
This approach of labeling was used within Northern Ireland as well, 
where Protestant officials realized that they would lose popular 
support if they ever utilized counter-terrorism measures against the 
                                                     
269 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 387 
(2013).  
270 Donahue, supra note 40, at 12-13 (“[I]nternment has been one of the facts of 
Irish history and one of the means for securing the State in Northern Ireland, north 
or south” and describing Northern Ireland as a “place apart” and a “foreign coun-
try” (quoting MP’s in Westminster Parliament)).  British politicians also noted that 
no one in England would ever suffer the procedures that apply in Northern Ireland, 
but that “the same situation does not apply in England.”  Id. at 13.  
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Loyalists.271  Particularly with internment, though the counter-
terrorism measures never stated that they were to be used against 
Catholic paramilitary groups exclusively, at their inception that was 
the understood purpose.  This approach of labeling the sufferers of 
human rights violations as the “other” mirrors the easy distinctions 
drawn between radical Muslim terrorists and the rest of the world, 
justifying their need to be treated differently, and more harshly, than 
other criminals in light of their status as “unique.”  
A second justification for counter-terrorist measures is that, 
while the legislation may violate some civil rights, many of the acts 
that are forbidden are already illegal.272  Thus, the legislation is not 
inflicting undue harm.  This is similar, but not identical to the idea 
that, if you are not a terrorist, you likely have nothing to worry about 
because you are not committing criminal activity, and so your rights 
will likely not be infringed.  These arguments were recently used to 
encourage the passing of anti-terrorist legislation in the United 
States when confronted by concerns about infringement on civil 
liberties of civilians.  Congressman Pence argued that the counter 
terrorism measures would address only illegal behavior, and that 
the legislation was “about trust.  It is not about fear.  It is about 
trusting the law enforcement agencies of this country.”273  
A third justification that transcends time is the idea that 
“terrorist legislation [is] a statement that violence [will] not be 
tolerated.”274  British MPs frequently supported implementing 
legislation that suspended basic rights because they felt it 
demonstrated that Britain rejected terrorism, and had the courage to 
resist violence.275  This argument had the double-edged sword of 
simultaneously implying that any repeal of counter-terrorist 
                                                     
271 CIARAN MACAIRT, THE MCGURK’S BAR BOMBING: COLLUSION, COVER-UP AND 
A CAMPAIGN FOR TRUTH 64 (2013) (explaining that when he called for tougher coun-
ter-terrorism measures, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner “re-
alised [sic] he would lose the support of his party if Loyalists were interned.”).  The 
measures were, however, eventually used to intern and sentence paramilitaries of 
both religious backgrounds.  See generally Connolly, Living on the Past, supra note 8. 
272 Donahue, supra note 40, at 19. 
273 107 Cong. Rec. H7220 (Oct. 24, 2001) (statement of Rep. Pence), available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2001-10-24/pdf/CREC-2001-10-24-pt1-
PgH7220-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P4Z-MTXD] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).  
274 Donahue, supra note 40, at 14-15 (positing that “statutes serve as a moral 
statement”).  
275 Id.  
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legislation would symbolize acquiescence to terror.276  Indeed, any 
opponent of the legislation had to stress that it was not “going soft 
on terrorism,”277 in much the same way that Democrats stressed 
their hard line opinions when critiquing Republican anti-terrorism 
measures in the United States following September 11th.278  The 
similarities in the arguments used thirty years ago and those 
employed today are important.  If the judgments concerning the 
measures taken in the Troubles reveal that these arguments are not 
sufficient to justify the human rights violations imposed against 
Northern Ireland, then it is likely that another country will not be 
capable of using similar rhetoric to defend current counter-terrorism 
measures with success.   
Thus, because of these parallels in both the actions taken to 
counter terror, and the justifications used to excuse and prolong 
them, extensive litigation of the Troubles claims would likely have 
reverberating effects felt not only by the present-day counter-
terrorism measures employed by Great Britain, but by those 
elsewhere around the world.  Scholars have noted generally that 
many of the factors which caused the United Kingdom to implement 
extreme emergency measures that violated human rights law are 
“also at work in other liberal, democratic states faced with a terrorist 
challenge.”279 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Are there means available by which the Troubles’ claims can still 
be resolved?  By holding parliamentary sovereignty above 
international law, the British government has apparently stymied 
many attempts to apply much of international human rights 
legislation to historical cases.  International law on the whole faces 
problems of enforcement.  Perhaps the best method by which to 
confront the historical cases comes from the British courts 
themselves.  By setting national jurisprudence on a pedestal, the 
United Kingdom has created a powerful mechanism to curb 
                                                     
276 Id. at 14 (noting that “[i]n the absence of a cessation in terrorist activity, re-
peal might . . . indicate . . . a level of acceptance either of some degree of violence or 
of the use of violence for political ends”). 
277 Id. at 16.  
278 Id.  
279 Id. at 2. 
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counter-terrorism measures, and the British courts are in a uniquely 
capable place to do so regarding the Troubles cases because they 
involved solely citizens of the United Kingdom.  In recent years, the 
courts have begun to take a harder stance to protect civil liberties 
despite the war on terror.280  The recent decision to order a new 
inquest for the Pearse Jordan case is one such example.  Though they 
would likely face great political opposition, should the courts decide 
to get serious about forcing greater conformity to the ECHR and 
human rights generally, a decision to litigate the Troubles claims 
would be the perfect vehicle to do so, because those claims 
specifically raise the debate between security and protecting civil 
rights.   
Though large scale transitional justice mechanisms will likely 
never be endorsed by British officials, perhaps there are some 
suggestions that British courts could take from these mechanisms 
should they become more serious about litigating the Troubles’ 
cases.  The truth commission in South Africa was well known for its 
liberal use of amnesty to those who came forward, in exchange for 
their honest and open recounting of past events.  It remains unclear 
at this point if the families of victims of the Troubles would be open 
to a process that involved amnesty provisions.  However, many 
families stressed a desire to learn the truth about the involvement of 
the British government, especially regarding the higher-up policies 
of Westminster regarding Northern Ireland.281  The years of cover-
ups and collusion seem to make them yearn merely for truth from 
their government, and not for abject punishment for the 
perpetrators of the crimes.282  Though by no means a thorough 
consensus, the start of a conversation about the goals of the families 
suggests that amnesty could be a means of compromise the British 
courts might invoke.  
If amnesty is not a sufficiently strong incentive to bring 
witnesses and actors forward, ensuring anonymity to government 
actors may be another option.  In the second Jordan inquest, 
                                                     
280 Alan Travis & Vikram Dodd, Reid Warning to Judges Over Control Orders, 
THE GUARDIAN (May 24, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/poli-
tics/2007/may/25/uk.topstories3 [perma.cc/9G67-53KY] (last visited Jan 28, 2016) 
(detailing “the continuing struggle between ministers and the courts over civil lib-
erties and the fight against terrorism”).  
281 J.R. van Hoeven, A Narrative of Historical Cases 5 (Committee for the Ad-
ministration of Justice, January 2014) (unpublished manuscript).  
282 Id.  
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government officials and police officers involved in the crime 
testified behind a screen to protect their identities.  While this 
method would also assist in obtaining the truth behind the deaths of 
their loved ones, it has met with less enthusiasm from families.  The 
gratification of the truth might be somewhat tainted if the 
perpetrators and the superior officials who gave the orders resulting 
in victims’ deaths remain forever hidden by false names and 
mysterious testimony.  
If the claims from the Troubles are not resolved, the international 
community should more clearly address loopholes of enforcement 
in humanitarian law.  The Geneva Conventions and other charters 
apply in times of war, but increasingly, modern warfare looks very 
different from the more distinctive battles in days of old and the 
enforcement of rules becomes more important.  Different too from 
the legacy of the past is the attention being paid to counter-
terrorism.  Traditionally, if the international community is to break 
new ground quickly regarding human rights law, the attention paid 
to the issue is a needed catalyst for the change.  Thus, history 
suggests that if recognition of humanitarian law is to be expanded, 
now is the time to do it.  This paper explores the Troubles not only 
because the people of Northern Ireland deserve to have this violent 
chapter in their society’s history resolved, but because it may serve 
to demonstrate the destruction counter-terrorism can cause if left 
unchecked.  Should Great Britain take responsibility for this smaller 
example of destruction, then perhaps we can assign the stories of the 
victims of the Troubles even greater meaning.  They can be honored 
not simply as lives lost, but as a vehicle to protecting the lives of 
future members of society the next time justifications of counter-
terrorism seek to unleash an onslaught on human rights. 
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